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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This report – commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark – discusses the status of 
implementation of the EAC Customs Union and the SADC FTA both regarding tariff reductions 
and NTB elimination commitments and uses trade statistics to investigate whether the 
implementation of these two trade agreements influence data for regional trade. The report also 
discusses the relationship between the EAC and SADC regional integration processes and the 
negotiation of EPAs. Special focus is accorded to the question of NTBs including deriving lessons 
for the design of an alternative policy approach to manage their negative impacts on trade. 
The two regions have concentrated their efforts to implement their ambitious plans for economic 
integration on implementing tariff reductions and NTB removal mechanisms. The tariff reductions 
are nearly completed for both regions. SADC has allowed more deviations in terms of time limited 
derogations than the EAC, yet regional trade are today mostly free of tariffs in both the EAC and 
SADC. SADC trade preferences however appear underused by the region’s traders, presumably 
because cumbersome Rules of Origin make the alternative schemes in the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) more 
attractive. 
The NTB removal mechanisms have been far less successful. The NTB removal mechanisms 
established in both the EAC and SADC collect complaints about NTBs from the private sector and 
channel their concerns to the officials in charge for the policies in question. Given the novelty of the 
two mechanisms, it may be too early to judge their merits. A large number of complaints have been 
made in both regions, but although the responsible agencies involved report that a substantial share 
of the complaints has been solved, this reported success rate is challenged by independent observers. 
Undoubtedly, the mechanisms have increased transparency but in terms of removing NTBs, they 
have largely failed so far. 
The trade statistics fail to pick up a strong response to the formation of the EAC Customs Union 
and the SADC FTA. Yet interesting information emerges. Over the last decade, both regions 
experienced strong growth in merchandise trade and saw some limited signs of diversification. Both 
regions also developed much stronger ties with China and to some extent with the other BRICs 
while the EU lost importance yet remains the most importing trading partner. EAC exports more 
than quadrupled from 2000 to 2010. The intra-regional share of total trade grew although only 
modestly. The share of exports to China grew strongly, from 0.2% to 6.4% of total exports, while 
the share of exports to the EU was nearly halved. The pattern was the same on the import side. 
Interestingly, the BRICs as a group surpassed the EU as the EAC’s biggest source of imports. 
SADC exports grew less, yet ended two and a half times higher in 2010 than a decade before. The 
intra-SADC trade share was stagnant. The share of exports to China increased from 1.2% to 11.0% 
while the share of EU-bound exports fell from 38.1% to 27.1%. A similar pattern exists for the 
import side. 
The interaction between the development of economic integration in the EAC and SADC and the 
negotiations of EPAs with the EU is worrying. Observers argue that the EAC and SADC would 
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benefit from tying their commitments to reduce tariffs and other barriers to a larger agreement. The 
argument is that non-compliance with EAC and SADC commitments would become politically 
more costly when such non-compliance would also breach an EPA with the larger partner, the EU. 
Yet, while such opportunities to derive real benefits from EPAs exist, the EPAs also complicate the 
already difficult challenge of developing the cooperation in the EAC and SADC and later in the 
form of the Tripartite. 
The state of knowledge of NTBs is much less developed than what would be expected from the 
recent surge in publications on NTBs in the EAC and SADC. However, most evidence refers back 
to the same surveys which have faced considerable problems identifying NTBs not to mention 
assessing their severity. What has emerged from the publications is an increased awareness that 
NTBs are plentiful but too little is still known about how severe they are, what their impacts are on 
industries and in aggregate and how to prioritize their removal. NTBs are particularly problematic 
when they origin in policy measures that serve a legitimate purpose. Such policy measures are 
becoming more common as the EAC and SADC face new demands for regulation of areas like food 
safety. The existing EAC and SADC capacity to regulate these areas is quite low and the 
international models for designing less trade restrictive measures are often not readily available for 
African countries because such models were developed for much higher income countries. 
The report recommends the development of a new approach to NTB removal that focus on 
designing models of less trade restrictive regulation appropriate for Africa. This approach focuses 
on developing knowledge and collecting best practice in key issues universally agreed to be subject 
to important NTBs like food safety. This approach – which we label the issue-based approach – 
should bring together technical knowledge, policy practitioners and policy analysis. Technical 
people with long experiences and deep insight into the issue under study should be coupled with 
analytical capacity to investigate the wider implications of policy initiatives. This approach has 
worked in the case of customs reform where in-country practitioners work with international 
agencies with the capacity to collect cross-country experiences and analyze these with a view to 
extracting international best practice. International agencies, organizations and donors could 
develop an issue-focused approach to reducing NTBs for such issues. These actors have the 
capacity and the experience across many developing countries to work with developing country 
governments and firms to enhance the understanding of trade facilitation aspects of emerging 
regulatory issues and collect best practice experiences of what works and what does not. 
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1 Introduction 
Fred Bergsten of the Peterson Institute in Washington DC first formulated the bicycle theory of 
trade liberalization: it has to keep going, if it doesn’t you fall. In the East African Community (EAC) 
and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) there are plenty of obstacles that could 
cause the process of liberalization to fail. In the past, African countries often established regional 
agreements but did little to implement them. Even if tariff reductions are implemented and 
sustained, Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) threaten to reverse the gains made from tariff liberalization. 
Outside influences also affect the process, most importantly through the Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) advocated strongly by the European Union (EU) but viewed with scepticism by 
many African countries and feared by observers to constitute a threat to continued development of 
regional integration.  
This report – commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark –presents and discusses 
the recent literature and the empirical data on regional integration in the EAC and SADC. We focus 
on the current situation on the ground: how far the EAC and SADC have gone in implementing the 
EAC Customs Union and the SADC FTA and how the newly implemented agreements may have 
affected the flows of trade and investment. We emphasise the issue of NTBs. If not managed well, 
NTBs become one of those obstacles that threaten to stop liberalisation. Liberalisation always starts 
by eliminating tariffs, and then it has to proceed to the barriers that are not tariffs. The liberalisation 
process cannot stop if it is to succeed because the vested interests that used to be protected by the 
tariffs are still there. This is the situation in the EAC and SADC. Both trading blocs just finished 
removing most tariffs and their businessmen and politicians appear well aware that vested interests 
exist that do not share the official vision of the EAC and SADC to grow through open trade but 
would rather prefer to use NTBs to do the job that tariffs used to do. 
Denmark financially supports regional integration in Africa as do numerous other bilateral and 
multilateral institutions. We therefore focus intensively on extracting policy-relevant knowledge 
and leave aside most of the more academic discussions on regional trade in Africa. Because this 
report is written for busy policy makers, we have included short summaries of the individual 
chapters at the end of each one thereby allowing a busy mind to jump directly to the issue of highest 
importance to his or her work without having to read the entire report. The report is organized as 
follows. Chapter 2 outlines economic theory on the establishment of successful regional trade 
arrangements. Chapter 3 assess the status of the implementation of the EAC Customs Union and the 
SADC FTA. Chapter 4 analyses trade and investment flows in the two regions while chapter 5 
assesses the literature on and policy responses to NTBs. Chapter 6 analyzes the opportunities and 
challenges of including services, investment and government procurement in EPAs including the 
ECA and SADC. Chapter 7 asks the question whether the proposed EPAs support trade integration 
with the EAC and SADC. Chapter 8 concludes and offers policy recommendations. 
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2 Opportunities and challenges for regional integration in the EAC and SADC 
International trade theory provides some traditional arguments for regional economic integration in 
the forms of preferential trade liberalization such as the formation of free trade areas and custom 
unions. These arguments often rest on the notions of trade creation and trade diversion (Viner 1950). 
On the one hand, regional trade typically increases amongst member countries due to the lowering 
of internal trade barriers within the region. This increase in trade or “trade creation” can be welfare 
improving as increased regional trade implies reduced inefficient domestic production in individual 
member countries. On the other hand, existing trade flows between member countries and countries 
outside of the region might drop due to the preferential liberalization. If the switch from extra-
regional trade to intra-regional trade for a member country implies trading with a higher cost 
regional trade partner, then the situation of “trade diversion” arises and economic welfare for 
member countries within the region might be reduced due to the inefficiencies associated with the 
high-cost intra-regional trade (and/or loss of tariff revenues).  The combined effects of trade 
creation and diversion dictate whether a specific preferential trade agreement is welfare improving 
or reducing.  
In general, it is possible for members to benefit from a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) so long as the 
combined terms of trade and efficiency effects (or tariff revenue effects) of forming the agreement 
are positive. More precisely, the Kemp-Wan theorem (Kemp and Wan 1976) and the Krishna and 
Panagariya theorem (Panagariya and Krishna 2002) give respectively the conditions under which 
customs unions and FTAs can be welfare improving.  The Kemp-Wan theorem states that for a 
customs union to be welfare improving for member countries, it is sufficient to set the common 
external tariffs at such levels that world market prices at which members of the customs union trade 
with the rest of the world remain unchanged, thus leading to unchanged trade flows between union 
members and the rest of the world. Even if total trade flows the union has with the rest of the world 
are unchanged, it is still possible that those concerning individual member countries may change, 
thereby resulting in gainers and losers within the customs union in terms of changing tariff revenues. 
In that case, it is also necessary for union members to agree to an inter-member transfer mechanism 
to even out the losses and gains across members. Similar to the Kemp-Wan theorem, Panagariya 
and Krishna (2002) give a sufficient condition for welfare-improving FTAs in that individual 
members of the FTA need to individually set their external tariffs such that prices and trade flows 
with the rest of the world remain unchanged.  
While it is theoretically possible to make FTAs welfare-improving, in reality such conditions might 
be difficult to meet. Applicable international trade laws such as the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) agreements generally only require members of an FTA or customs union not to increase 
their tariffs on imports from non-members and that the FTA should cover substantially all intra-
regional trade. Therefore, whether a specific trade agreement improves welfare for its members is 
largely an empirical question that cannot be answered theoretically. 
Aside from the “static” gains from improved efficiencies as discussed above, FTAs may also 
enhance economic welfare of member countries by allowing firms to access larger regional markets 
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and realize increasing returns (Krugman, 1979). More intensive competitions on the regional market 
will also improve the welfare for consumers as more competition tends to lead to more product 
varieties, better quality and lower prices. In addition, an integrated regional market with re-
configured production patterns due to trade liberalization may create a larger market for attracting 
foreign direct investment. Other benefits from forming an FTA are also suggested, such as the 
advantages of using the external pressure from the FTA to initiate and implement needed domestic 
economic reforms, applying the FTA as a signal mechanism for attracting investment, and the 
benefits from participating in trade talks (for instance, the WTO negotiations and region-to-region 
trade negotiations such as the negotiations of the EPAs with the EU) as a group.            
While regional integrations can theoretically provide the EAC and SADC regions the opportunities 
for increasing intra-regional trade, improving economic welfare and promoting economic growth, 
there are various challenges that need to be managed for these potential benefits to be realizable. 
Indeed, as will be shown in Chapter 4 of this report, even though regional trade flows in the EAC 
and SADC regions have been on the rise in recent years, shares of intra-regional trade in these 
regions’ total trade flows have not expanded accordingly. As compared to other regions in the world, 
intra-regional trade in Africa has generally been relatively lower, indicating that there might be 
untapped trade potentials (Brenton and Isik 2012). In the following discussion, several challenges 
facing regional integrations in the EAC and SADC regions are summarized. 
As indicated by the basic trade theory of preferential trade liberalization, for member countries to 
gain from forming an FTA, it is necessary that the entailed tariff liberalization measures lead to 
joint terms of trade and efficiency gains without resulting offsetting losses related to trade diversion. 
Generally speaking, the FTA should liberalize substantially all trade within the region to maximize 
the potential for trade creation within the region; and any exceptions to and exemptions from the 
liberalization schedules should not be substantial. In connection to this consideration, tariff 
liberalizations are generally deeper and better implemented in the EAC region as this region has 
already implemented a customs union and is currently discussing the formation of a common 
market and a monetary union, but not necessarily so in the SADC region, where member states of 
the SADC FTA are more diversified in terms of their development stages and where there is a well-
established customs union (i.e. SACU which includes only a subset of the SADC countries) within 
the more loosely connected free trade area, thereby making the complete trade liberalization a 
challenging task. Furthermore, average external trade barriers (or the average common external 
tariff (CET) barriers in the case of a custom union) should not be raised as a result of regional 
integration to upset existing external trade flows. Towards this end, it is especially challenging for 
the EAC and SADC regions to properly manage their own regional integration processes and their 
participation in trade talks with other countries/regions as well as in the multilateral trade 
negotiations, as the latter processes will influence how the CETs are designed and implemented. In 
the case of SADC region, additional challenges lie in the difficulties with managing the relationship 
between the SACU and the rest of the SADC regions. 
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Summary 
Using regional economic integration to improve incomes in Eastern and Southern Africa 
necessitates that policy makers maximize trade creation and minimize trade diversion. While this 
necessary condition for improving incomes is well known to trade economists, it is less appreciated 
by policy practitioners. Furthermore, the condition is difficult to translate from abstract economic 
theory to applicable policy. Yet, two rules of thump exist. First, the EAC and SADC should strive 
to liberalize substantially all intra-regional trade to maximize the potential for trade creation. 
Second, to minimize the risk of trade diversion, average external barriers should not be raised. 
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3 Status of implementation 
3.1 The East African Community 
By 1 January 2010 all tariffs between the EAC Partner States had been removed – a remarkable 
achievement considering the difficulties experienced by other African regional communities 
attempting to do the same thing. The freeing of regional trade is the most significant achievement in 
the process of East African economic integration. EAC followed a short route to free regional trade 
by creating a customs union as the first step thereby avoiding the customary step of establishing a 
Free Trade Area that SADC and most other regional economic communities follow. 
EAC works intensively to further liberalise economic ties by establishing a Common Market. The 
most important aspect is to supplement tariff removal with the reduction of NTBs – work that 
currently preoccupies the Partner States and which we will discuss in detail in section 5. Beyond the 
Common Market, the EAC officially plans to follow an EU-style plan establishing an East African 
Monetary Union, a highly debated move that was planned to be implemented by 2012. This plan 
that even include talks about creating a political federation at an unspecified future data still 
surfaces at EAC Summits and similar high-level political meetings, however, for the time being the 
major efforts at concentrated at maintaining the Customs Union and working towards the Common 
Market. 
Partner States removed intra-regional tariffs smoothly (Mugisa, Onyango and Mugoya 2009). 
Internal trade was liberalized immediately for all intra-EAC trade flows except Kenyan exports to 
the rest of the EAC. Kenyan exports were gradually allowed ever easier access throughout the five 
year transition period. When Rwanda and Burundi joined the EAC, they reduced tariffs on trade 
with the other Partner States from June 2009. Prior to the Customs Union, Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda applied COMESA tariff preferences on most of intra-EAC trade. Thus the tariff 
liberalisation that followed from the EAC Customs Union took place from an already low level 
(Stahl 2005). 
During the implementation phase, the external tariff rates of the Partner States were harmonized in a 
CET scheme consisting of three tariff bands: 0% for raw materials and capital goods; 10% for 
intermediate goods; and 25% for consumer goods. But for some products, tariffs are much higher. 
The EAC has identified 58 products as ‘sensitive’, these products are subjected to higher tariff 
which may even be higher than the tariffs in existence before the Customs Union. The tariffs for 
sensitive products are set at between 35 and 100%, i.e. 35, 40, 45, 50, 55, 60, 75 and 100%. Table 1 
presents examples of the tariffs on sensitive products. 
Mugisa, Onyango and Mugoya (2009) find that on average the adoption of the CET liberalised EAC 
external trade. Naturally, the average effect masks considerable diversity at the level of individual 
tariff lines. The introduction of the three band CET meant that in Uganda 3,066 tariff lines were 
expected to increase compared to 1,224 in Tanzania and 1,144 in Kenya. In Kenya the CET lowered 
3,216 tariff lines, more than in Tanzania (2,364) and Uganda (1,353). The average tariffs in Kenya  
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Table 1. Tariff rates of selected sensitive products 
Product Rate (%) 
Milk and cream 60 
Wheat and meslin grain 35 
Wheat and meslin flour 60 
Maize 50 
Rice 75 
Cane and beet sugar 100 
Khanga, Kikoy, Kitenge 50 
Worn clothes 45 
Source: Mugisa, Onyango and Mugoya (2009). 
 
 
and Tanzania, respectively, had dropped from 16.8% and 13.5%, to 11.6%. However, for Uganda, 
the average tariff rate rose from 9% prior to the implementation of the CET. Furthermore, the 
Customs Union brought enhanced transparency and predictability to exporters and investors. 
Contrary to expectations a 2009 evaluation of the impact of the Customs Union finds that the total 
tax revenue has actually increased in all Partner States despite the initial fears that the CET would 
diminish government revenue. The report attributes the revenue increase to improved trade and 
economic growth combined with better customs administration in the individual Partner States 
(Mugisa, Onyango and Mugoya 2009). 
Now, the EAC works both towards the establishment of the Common Market and to maintain the 
benefits of the Customs Union. Kenyan president Mwai Kibaki officially on 1 July 2010 launched 
the East African Common Market Protocol. The protocol aims at the free movement of labour, 
capital, goods and services within the EAC. Most efforts are done to eliminate NTBs on goods 
while many of the other elements of the envisioned Common Market receive less attention. In 
parallel, Partner States need to remain committed to preserve the gains achieved of the Customs 
Union. Media reports of deviations from the new customs regime and Peter Kiguta, EAC Customs 
and Trade Director General, has warned that Partner States must refrain from imposing taxes and 
levies of equivalent effect to tariffs and granting duty exemptions outside the CET (tralac 2010). 
3.2 East African Community 
Compared to the smooth implementation of the EAC Customs Union, the ride towards the less 
ambitious SADC Free Trade Area has been decisively bumpier. The SADC Protocol on Trade was 
signed in Maseru in August 1996 by eleven Member States and entered into force on January 25, 
2000. Tariff reductions were initiated on 1 September, 2000 and were scheduled to result in a Free 
Trade Area. Soon the Member States made more ambitious plans for further economic integration. 
In 2003, SADC adopted the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan. With the plan, the 
Member States both planned the implementation of the FTA in detail and outlined a 15-year 
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framework for intensified regional integration until 2018. SADC would finalize the FTA in 2008 
opting to create a WTO legal FTA covering 85% of the regional trade in goods while eliminating 
the tariffs on the rest by 2012. Two years before, in 2010, Member States should have completed 
negotiations on the SADC Customs Union, and they planned to finalize negotiations on a Common 
Market in 2015. Farther out in the horizon SADC should form the basis for a monetary union and 
eventually an economic union by 2018. Since the tariff liberalisation schedule has driven economic 
integration while much of the rest of the economic integration agenda has proven to be premature. 
In 2010, the SADC Summit in Windhoek postponed the establishment of a Customs Union. 
However, after a slow start, SADC has successfully cut tariffs and established the FTA envisaged in 
the SADC Protocol on Trade according to which Member States had agreed to phase out tariffs over 
the 2000 to 2012 period1. The slow start is evident in Tables 2 and 3 indicating the tariff offers 
made in terms of percentages of tariff lines (not volume of trade). To counter fears of the economic 
strength of South Africans, Member States agreed to follow two schedules: one for offers to South 
Africa (table 2) and one for offers to all other Member States (table 3). As indicated, the reductions 
were heavily back-loaded with most of the reduction years planned for the latest years. The tables 
include the twelve Member States participating in the Protocol on Trade: South Africa, Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, Madagascar2, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. Angola has signed the Protocol but has not yet submitted instruments of accession. 
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Seychelles have not yet signed the Protocol. 
Five of the Members States, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland, were 
already part of SACU established in 1910. Therefore these five countries appear jointly under the 
title of SACU in the tables. 
The United States’ Agency for International Development (USAID) funded Southern Africa Trade 
Hub project has monitored the implementation of the Protocol on Trade since 2007 issuing annual 
Trade Audits. The 2007 Audit was comprehensive while the subsequent Audits have been updates 
 
Table 2. SADC tariff reduction offers to South Africa 
 # 
Lines 
2001 2005 2008 2010 2011 2012 2015 Excluded 
Malawi 5,443 33,4 33,4 84.9 84.9 84.9 99.7  0.3 
Mauritius 5,479 69.4 69.7 90.5 90.5 90.5 100.0  0.0 
Mozambique 5,246 28.1 28.1 92.6 92.6 92.6 92.6 99.6 0.4 
Tanzania 6,217 15.7 15.7 84.5 84.5 84.5 99.3  0.7 
Zambia 6,066 32.1 32.1 95.8 95.8 95.8 100.0  0.0 
Zimbabwe 7,167 32.0 44.4 71.8 72.7 82.3 82.3  0.8 
Source: SATH (2010), Table 2, p. 6. 
 
                                                          
1 Mozambique has a derogation to extend the period of tariff reduction for trade with South Africa to 2015. 
2 Madagascar is currently suspended from SADC, yet still eligible for Protocol of Trade benefits. 
16 
 
Table 3. SADC tariff reduction offers to all SADC Member States except South Africa 
 # 
Lines 
2001 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Excluded 
SACU 7,802 63.6 94,2 99,2 99.2 99.2 99.2 99.2 0.8 
Malawi 5,443 33,4 33,4 85,3 85.3 85.3 85.3 99.7 0.3 
Mauritius 5,479 69,7 90,5 90,5 90.5 90.5 90.5 100.0 0.0 
Mozambique 5,246 30,1 30,1 94,0 94.0 94.0 94.0 99.6 0.4 
Tanzania 6,215 24,4 24,4 86.3 86.3 86.5 86.5 99.3 0.7 
Zambia 6,066 54,2 54,2 95.9 95.9 95.9 95.9 100.0 0.0 
Zimbabwe 7,167 70,6 70,6 89.8 93.1 93.2 95.0 98.7 1.3 
Source: SATH (2010), Table 1, p. 5. 
 
 
of the 2007 study with special focus on areas identified by the SADC Secretariat. The 2011 audit 
contained in SATH (2011) focused on tariff reductions, NTB elimination, third party preferential 
trade agreements, implementation of revised Rules of Origin and the status of the 2010 Action Plan. 
The first Trade Audit found that many Member States did not implement the tariff cuts they had 
committed to (SATH 2007), but by the end of the implementation period the situation improved 
greatly. Table 4 evaluates Member State compliance towards the end of the implementation period. 
All Member States except Malawi and Zimbabwe are broadly respecting their commitments. SATH 
(2011) concludes that intra-SADC tariffs would be largely eliminated by January 2012. Tanzania 
and Zimbabwe obtained time-limited derogations on a small number of products. SATH (2011) 
assesses the impact of these derogations and concludes that the trade damages to the other SADC 
countries are likely to be minimal and transient.  
From 2008 to 2012, the Member States have agreed to remove the remaining tariffs on ‘sensitive 
products’ leaving only a category of ‘excluded products’ subject to duties. Excluded goods were 
determined by each Member State as part of its original offer. Chapter 93 (Arms and Ammunitions) 
is always excluded from the Protocol. The list of excluded products as provided in Table 5 is rather 
small. 
Contrary to the Customs Union of the EAC, the SADC FTA suffers from difficult-to-use Rules of 
Origin. Rules of Origin are necessary in FTAs to determine eligibility for preferences and to avoid 
trade deflection. Rules of Origin have been highly contentious in SADC negotiations. 
Twosignificant revisions have taken place. The last revision of the rules was adopted in 2008. 
SATH (2011) discusses the implementation of the revised rules. Contrary to the 2008 decision, 
Member States have not reported on implementation of the revised rules, a deficiency that causes 
doubts about which rules are applied: the 2008 or the 2004 ones? SATH (2011) reports that five 
countries (Botswana, Mauritius, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia) have implemented the  
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Table 4. SADC Member States tariff reductions 
Country Compliance Comments 
SACU Full Individual SACU Members may apply tariffs outside of the SACU 
CET 
Malawi Partial Only 46% of tariff lines under SACU and SADC offers are 
compliant with obligations equivalent to 2004 and 2005 for the 
SADC and SACU offers respectively 
Mauritius Likely full Some discrepancies existed but likely to have disappeared with 1 
January 2012 reductions 
Mozambique Likely full Parliament has approved the all 2000 to 2015 tariff reduction 
commitments in one block; few significant issues regarding 
implementation 
Tanzania Nearly full Parliament has approved the all 2000 to 2012 tariff reduction 
commitments in one block; few significant issues regarding 
implementation; request derogation on sugar and certain types of 
paper 
Zambia Nearly full Parliament has approved 2008-2012 reduction commitments, yet 
problems persists of discrepancies between applied and committed 
rates; private sector experience transparency problems and has 
difficulties determining expected tariffs 
Zimbabwe Partial Zimbabwe has not implemented reduction commitments since 2008 
and has obtained a derogation to postpone the liberalisation of 
sensitive products with two years. 
Source: SATH 2011. 
 
 
Table 5. Excluded products 
Country # lines Product categories with excluded tariff lines 
a b
 
SACU 31 Sugar and sugar products; Used clothing; Motor vehicle parts 
Malawi 19 Sugar 
Mozambique 19 Ivory 
Tanzania 43 Ivory and other restricted animal hides/materials; Opium; Propellant 
powder (explosive) 
Zimbabwe 
c
 34/89 Jet/specialized fuels; Vehicle/parts; Rear view mirrors; Used clothing; 
Radioactive products; Used tires; Precious metals 
Notes: 
a
 The product categories indicated include many tariff lines of which only some were 
excluded; 
b
 Chapter 93 (Weapons and ammunitions) is excluded for all Member States; 
c 
.Zimbabwe excluded 34 tariff lines in its offer to South Africa and 89 in its offer to the rest of 
SADC. Source: SATH 2011. 
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revised rules, four countries (Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, and South Africa) have not and two 
countries (Swaziland and Zimbabwe) cannot be verified. Furthermore, Member States occasionally 
report difficulties in verifying Certificates of Origin. 
3.3 Summary 
The plans for economic integration in Eastern and Southern Africa are ambitious. For some aspects 
like common curriencies and other aspects of policy coordinations, the plans are little developed, 
while action has been effective on the more limited goal of removing tariffs on regional trade. There 
is some variation between the degree of implementation of tariff cuts between the EAC and SADC. 
The EAC Customs Union is fully implemented; this was achieved on time with only insignificant 
deviations and delays. The EAC Partner States have removed nearly all intra-EAC tariffs and 
established a CET which is lower for most but not all. The SADC FTA is also nearly fully 
implemented however after some initial difficulties and in a much less effective way than the 
admittedly simpler EAC Customs Union. Initially, many Member States delayed tariff reduction but 
nearly all now meet their liberalization commitments. The operation of the Rules of Origin 
necessary for the SADC FTA is a big threat to deriving benefits from the tariff reductions. 
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4 Trade and investment flows in EAC and SADC 
This section offers an overview on intra-regional trade flows within the EAC and SADC regions 
during the period of 2000-2010. For comparison purposes, these two regions’ trade with the rest of 
the world, particularly with their traditional trading partners in the developed world and with key 
emerging economies (such as China and the other countries in the BRIC group consisting of Brazil, 
Russia, India and China), are also discussed. Bilateral merchandise trade flows drawn from the UN 
COMTRADE database are used. In addition, these two regions’ service trade and foreign direct 
investment are also discussed using respectively data sourced from the UN service trade database 
and the United Nations’ Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) database on Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI). 
4.1 East African Community 
4.1.1 Total intra-EAC and extra-EAC merchandise trade flows 
Total intra-EAC trade measured as exports reported by the EAC countries increased from around 
US$500 million in 2000 to more than US$2.36 billion in 2010, representing a percentage increase 
of more and 370% (see Appendix A - Tables 1a and 1b). During the same period, EAC’s total 
exports to the world grew at a slightly lower pace, increasing from US$2.67 billion to 11.35 billion. 
As a result, the share of intra-EAC exports in the total exports from the EAC to the world actually 
increased from 18.7% in 2000 to 20.8% in 2010. The most dramatic changes in EAC’s exports, 
however, are associated with the relative importance of the markets of the EU, China, and other 
Sub-Saharan African countries (i.e. Sub-Saharan Africa countries excluding South Africa and the 
EAC countries themselves; hereafter we call this group ‘rest of Africa’). The rest of Africa’s share 
of EAC exports rose from 6.7% in 2000 to 15.1% in 2010, while that of China increased from 0.2% 
to 6.4% in the same period. The combined increase of export shares of the rest of Africa and China 
(about 14.6 percentage points), together with the increased share of intra-EAC exports (2.1 
percentage points), explains much of the declining share of the EU market (from 38% in 2000 to 
19.7%, representing a reduction of 18.3 percentage points). It is important to also note that in value 
terms, the EAC’s exports to the EU actually increased from around US$1 billion to 2.24 billion 
during the period; however, this increase is at a much slower pace as compared to the EAC’s 
exports growth to other markets. 
Another way to measure growth of intra-regional trade flows is to examine the import statistics. 
Due to the availability of data, differences between the valuations of import and export statistics, as 
well as the quality of data, total intra-regional imports and exports reported by the EAC countries 
cannot be easily reconcilable even though in principle they should reasonably match each other. In 
terms of total imports, the EAC region generally maintained a large trade deficit as its total imports 
were more than twice of its total exports in value terms during the 2000-2010 period. In terms of 
import compositions by sources, China and other BRIC countries’ shares increased significantly 
from 9.6% to 24.5%, whereas the EU’s share decreased from 27% to 17%. Surprisingly, although 
the EAC increased its exports to the rest of Africa region, the importance of this region as a source 
of imports was more or less unchanged.  
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Based on the above and despite potential inconsistencies between the import and export flows 
reported by the EAC countries, it appears that the intra-EAC trade had grown in similar paces as the 
EAC’s total trade flows, the latter of which had expanded quite rapidly in the recent decade. In 
terms of regional compositions of export destination and import sources, the most notable 
observation is that the EU’s importance had diminished especially as an export destination. At the 
same time, the importance of the BRIC countries, especially China, increased quite dramatically. 
Also, China and other BRIC countries become more important sources of imports into the EAC as 
compared to their role as destinations of EAC exports. Finally, the rest of Africa region proved to 
be a most dynamic growth region for EAC’s exports but its role as a source of import into the EAC 
remains very limited. 
4.1.2 Top traded HS-6 products within the EAC 
Looking at the commodity composition of inter-regional exports at the Harmonized System (HS)-6 
digit level, as shown in Table 2 in Appendix A, it is clear that while the EAC countries generally 
export limited ranges of products to each other, there is also a general trend that they had diversified 
their export baskets to each other in recent years. For Burundi and Uganda, the top five export 
products at HS-6 level represented respectively 97.6% and 73.2% of these two counties’ total intra-
EAC exports in 2000, while in the case of the more diversified economies Kenya and Tanzania, the 
same shares were respectively 28.2% and 48.1%. In 2010, the export shares of the top five products 
decreased significantly for Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania, with reductions in percentage points 
ranging from nearly 40 percentage points for Uganda, 25 percentage points for Burundi, and 18 
percentage points for Tanzania. Kenya continued to have the most diversified export baskets with 
shares of its top five exports dropping from 28.2% to 22.7%. 
Along with exporting more diversified export baskets in intra-EAC trade, there is also some 
evidence of upgrading from primary and unprocessed products to light manufacturing and 
processed products. For instance, Tanzania’s top exports in 2010 include fertilizers, textiles, and 
liquefied natural gas. 
As the EAC countries export limited ranges of products to each other, it is only natural that they 
also import limited ranges of products from each other. The top five import products at HS6 level 
comprised of between 30.6% (for Tanzania) and 62.7% (for Uganda) of these countries’ total intra-
regional imports. These shares dropped noticeably during the past decade. For instance, import 
shares of the top five products decreased from 48.2% to 25.2% for Kenya and from 62.7% to 31.9% 
for Uganda, suggesting that these countries also diversified their intra-regional imports. 
4.1.3 Development of service trade and FDI 
The five EAC member countries are highly heterogeneous when it comes to their service exports 
(see Appendix A - Table 3). Burundi and Rwanda had hardly any service exports in the earlier years 
of the past decade, while Kenya and Tanzania had substantial service exports. In the case of Kenya, 
its service exports nearly doubled from US$1.88 billion in 2005 to 3.67 billion in 2010. Tanzania’s 
service exports nearly tripled from 2000 to 2010 when the total reached US$1.85 billion. Elsewhere 
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in the region, Burundi remained a very small service provider, while Uganda and Rwanda increased 
their service exports considerably. 
Being the largest service exporter in the region, Kenya relies on transportation services, travel, 
government services, and communication services, with the growth of the transportation sector 
driving much of the growth in its service trade. Tanzania, the 2
nd
 largest service exporter in the 
region, exported in far fewer sectors with a dominant travel service sector which experienced rapid 
growth in recent years. 
According to the FDI data compiled by UNCTAD (Appendix A - Table 4), inward FDI into the 
EAC as a whole had increased from less than US$600 million in 2000 to over 1.7 billion in 2010. 
The main recipients of inward investment flows in the EAC region are Uganda and Tanzania, with 
the rest of the region receiving very little investment. Compared to the inward investment flows into 
the EAC countries, there were virtually no outward FDI from these countries, suggesting that most 
of the inward FDI flows into the EAC region were actually from outside of the regions. 
4.2 Southern African Development Community 
4.2.1 Total intra-SADC and extra-SADC merchandise trade flows 
There are fifteen official members of the SADC region but not all of these countries reported their 
trade data to the UN COMTRADE database. Most notably, both Angola and DRC are missing in 
the COMTRADE database for all the years during the period of 2000-2010. In addition, Lesotho, 
Swaziland, Namibia, Seychelles, and Zimbabwe are missing for various years. Therefore, the 
following summary is drawn on what is actually available from the COMTRADE database and may 
not represent the true total intra-SADC trade flows. 
Total exports from the SADC region to the world increased from around US$38.4 billion to nearly 
96.9 billion in 2010, with the peak reaching over 100 billion in 2008 (see Appendix A - Tables 5a 
and 5b). During the period, between 4% and 5.7% of these exports were to South Africa, the largest 
economy in the SADC region. In fact, comparing SADC’s export shares to South Africa in 2000 
and 2010 reveals that South Africa’s importance as an export destination actually diminished 
slightly (from 4.5% in 2001 to 4.2% in 2010). Likewise, the share of total intra-SADC exports in 
total exports from SADC remained quite stable, starting at 15.3% in 2000, peaking at 18% in 2006 
and then dropping to 15.5% in 2010. Similarly, there had not been noticeable relative changes in 
SADC’s exports to other African countries. In fact, the share of SADC’s exports to other Sub 
Saharan African countries (i.e. Sub Saharan Africa minus the SADC region) only increased 
marginally during the period (from 2.3% in 2000 to 3.9% in 2010). In summary, it appears that 
growth of intra-SADC exports as well as SADC’s exports to other African countries had largely 
tracked the general development of SADC’s total exports during the 2000-2010 period. 
Comparing the quite stable intra-SADC export shares, SADC’s exports to China and other BRIC 
countries increased quite significantly. In the case of China, SADC’s exports to China increased 
from US$445 million in 2000 to 10.7 billion, leading to an increase of export share of nearly 10 
percentage points for China. In contrast, despite a near doubling of SADC’s export values to the EU, 
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the share of SADC’s exports to the EU actually decreased from 38.1% to 27.1%, representing a 
reduction of 11 percentage points. 
SADC’s total imports from the world exceeded its exports to the world by a relatively smaller 
margin, as compared to the situation for EAC (see Appendix A - Tables 5a and 5b). In 2000, SADC 
imported roughly the same amount from the world as it exported to the world. By 2010, its total 
imports exceeded its total exports by about 25%, which is still far less than the percentage trade 
deficit of the EAC for the same year. In terms of the composition by import sources, South Africa 
had been an important source of imports into the other SADC countries but its share had been 
gradually declining from the peak of 19.5% in 2002 to 11.6% in 2010. Still, South Africa remains a 
more important source of imports into the SADC region, as compared to its role as an export 
destination (with an export share of only 4.2% in 2010). Furthermore, share of total intra-SADC 
imports in total SADC imports remained quite stable at around 17%, again suggesting that growth 
of intra-SADC trade flows by and large tracked the development of total SADC trade flows. 
Outside of the SADC region, China elevated its status as a major import source for SADC with its 
share of SADC’s imports rising from 3.6% in 2000 to 12.2% in 2010. In fact, SADC’s imports from 
China in 2010 were more than ten times of that in 2000 (i.e. from US$445 million to US$ 5.5 
billion). In contrast, the EU still maintained its position as the largest source of imports into SADC 
as its share of SADC’s imports was only reduced from 32.5% in 2000 to 26.4% in 2010, which is a 
much smaller reduction as compared to the EU’s reduced share of SADC exports.     
To summarize, during the period 2000-2010 intra-SADC trade largely kept pace with the overall 
growth of SADC’s total trade to the world, with intra-SADC trade comprising of between 15% 
(export share) to 17% (import share) of SADC’s total trade. Within the SADC region, South Africa 
is a more important source of imports as compared to its role as an export destination. With the rise 
of China and to a less extent the other BRIC countries as both sources of imports and destinations 
of exports for the SADC countries, the EU’s role on both the import and export fronts had declined. 
However, unlike the case of EAC, the EU remains a dominant trade partner for the SADC region 
with its shares of the SADC region’s total imports and exports still exceeding 25% in 2010. Lastly, 
unlike the case for the EAC, there are no noticeably increases in the SADC region’s trade with the 
rest of the Africa. 
4.2.2 Top traded HS-6 products within the SADC region 
Table 6 in Appendix A lists the top 5 exported products at HS-6 level for selected countries within 
the SADC region. For most of these countries, their top 5 exported products within the region 
comprised of a large share of their respective total intra-regional exports at the beginning of the 
period. In seven countries – Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Seychelles, Namibia, Swaziland, and 
Zambia – intra-SADC export shares of the top 5 products exceeded or were close to 50% in 2000, 
suggesting a very high degree of concentration of intra-regional exports in a few products in these 
countries. South Africa was an exception in 2000 with its top 5 export products claiming a share of 
only 21.6% in its total exports to SADC. This is certainly reasonable considering size of the South 
Africa economy as well as its level of development, relative to the rest of the SADC region. At the 
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end of the period considered (i.e. 2010 for most of the countries and 2008 or 2009 for several 
countries which did not report 2010 data to the COMTRADE database), shares of top 5 export 
products shrank considerably for many countries in the region, perhaps due to more diversified 
export baskets by these countries. However, several countries’ export share of top 5 products 
actually went up in the period, including Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. For 
Mozambique, sharp rise of frozen shrimps and prawns and oil products elevated the share of its top 
5 exports to be over 80% in 2010. In Tanzania, the share of urea exports bumped the share of its top 
5 exports to nearly 64%. And in Zimbabwe, rising shares of gold and raw sugar helped to increase 
the share of its top 5 exports to be over 79%. 
4.2.3 Service trade and FDI 
The SADC region had substantial service exports valued at more than US$9 billion in 2000, an 
amount that was more than doubled in the following decade, reaching the level of US$18.6 billion 
in 2010. South Africa is by far the most dominant service provider in the SADC region, with its 
share being in the range of 50% to 75% during the period. For the most recent year (2010), South 
Africa’s service exports reached nearly US$14 billion or about 75% of total service exports from 
the whole region. Other significant service exporters in the region include Mauritius, Tanzania, 
Madagascar, and Namibia, all of which exported more than or nearly one billion US dollars in 2010. 
Travel service and transportation services are among the main service exports for many SADC 
countries. For instance, 65% of South Africa’s service exports in 2010 were in the travel sector and 
another 12% were in the transportation service sector. In 2009, 50% of Mauritius’s service exports 
were in the travel sector and an additional 15% were in the transportation service sector. Other 
business services are also important for a number of SADC countries, including Botswana, 
Madagascar, Mauritius, South Africa and Swaziland. Several SADC countries also have substantial 
exports of government services and royalties and license fees.  
Considerable foreign investment was attracted into the SADC region in the 2000-2010 period. In 
2000, the SADC region attracted about US$4.4 billion inward FDI; by 2008 SADC’s inward FDI 
peaked at US$31.5 billion. In 2010, it levelled off to about US$19.5 billion. Although South Africa 
had been a major destination of inward FDI in the SADC region, it is Angola that consistently 
attracted the most foreign investment for most of the years in the period considered. The DRC also 
had considerable inward FDI in the more recent years.  
Outward FDI from the SADC region was quite limited for the same period and fluctuated from year 
to year. Total outward FDI from the region peaked at more than US$6.3 billion in 2006 and 
decreased to US$2 billion in 2010. South Africa had some substantial outward FDI in 2006 and 
2007, whereas in the more recent years Angola invested the most overseas. The generally large gap 
between the inward and outward FDI flows for the SADC region suggests that the SADC region 
remains a net recipient of inward FDI and that the bulk of the inward FDI into the region are likely 
from outside of the region. 
24 
 
4.3 Summary 
Over the last decade, both the EAC and SADC experienced strong growth in merchandise trade, 
saw some limited signs of diversification and – based on weak data – developed services trade and 
FDI too. Both regions also developed much stronger ties with China and to some extend with the 
other BRICs while the EU lost importance yet remains the most importing trading partner for both 
regions. 
In the EAC, exports more than quadrupled from 2000 to 2010. Most interestingly in the perspective 
of this report on regional integration, in the EAC, the intra-regional share of total trade grew 
although only modestly. The share of exports to China grew strongly, from 0.2% to 6.4% of total 
exports, while the share of exports to the EU was nearly halved. The pattern was the same on the 
import side. Interestingly, the BRICs as a group surpassed the EU as the EAC’s biggest source of 
imports. 
In SADC, exports were two and a half times higher in 2010 than a decade before. Intra-SADC trade 
stayed largely the same, although South Africa lost a bit of its traditional role as the country that 
trades the most within SADC. However, South Africa remains a strong source of imports for the 
other SADC countries. The share of exports to China increased from 1.2% to 11.0% while the share 
of EU-bound exports fell from 38.1% to 27.1%. On the import side, China grew four times more 
important as a source for imports over the period measured in share of imports. The EU remained 
the largest source of SADC imports but its share of total imports fell from roughly a third to a 
quarter. 
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5 Non-Tariff Barriers 
5.1 Introduction 
Academics’ research, international organisations’ policy reports, newspapers’ columns and 
politicians’ speeches all frequently emphasize NTBs. In this chapter, we present and discuss the 
most recent evidence on NTBs in the EAC and SADC: Exactly how plenty are they? How harmful 
are they? How do the EAC and SADC manage them? And how much do we really know? Some 
sources appear very certain that NTBs proliferate and are very costly – in a recent report on 
Southern Africa the World Bank estimates that NTBs in SADC cost “US$1.3 billion per year – 
equivalent to more than half of the GDP of Lesotho” (World Bank 2011: 26). But how certain are 
such estimates in the data scarce region of Eastern and Southern Africa on a topic like NTBs for 
which it is notoriously difficult to collect data? In this chapter, we will include considerations of 
what uncertainty means for our ability to answer the crucial questions stated on NTBs in the EAC 
and SADC NTBs. 
5.2 Nature and definition of NTBs 
Before we present the evidence with which we can answer the questions posed in this chapter, we 
need to understand what NTBs are. NTBs are part of a very large family of policy measures 
affecting trade. These measures are named Non-Trade Measures (NTMs) and some of them affect 
trade in a justifiable way, others do not. NTBs are those NTMs that cannot be justified. This 
definition is difficult to apply for policy practitioners because they find it hard to differentiate 
between a measure affecting trade in a justifiable way and one that does not. Consider food safety. 
Food safety policy often affects trade, so many food safety measures are NTMs and some of these 
may be NTBs. Whether they are one or the other depends on both design and application. EU 
aflatoxin limits in groundnuts typify both NTMs and NTBs. Aflatoxins are naturally occurring 
toxins produced be certain moulds that grow on food that has been stored improperly like under 
humid conditions. According to the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) – the most commonly accepted yardstick for whether 
NTMs are justifiable or not – EU aflatoxin limits on groundnuts are legitimate and thus not NTBs if 
backed by scientific evidence. This evidence should demonstrate that the limit set truly protect EU 
consumers against some hazard. Groundnut aflatoxin measures may pass this test as aflatoxins are 
known to be carcinogenic. But the test does not stop there because groundnut aflatoxin limits may 
be used to create trade barriers despite having a noble objective. Such measures could be used to 
discriminate between domestic and foreign producers or between different foreign consumers. If the 
EU argues that aflatoxin limits should be higher for imported groundnuts than for home produced 
ones, the rules would be discriminatory and the groundnut rules would not be justifiable and thus be 
an NTB. Another possibility illustrating yet another aspect of NTBs arises when considering that 
the aflatoxin limit may be properly designed but poorly implemented. If testing two import 
consignments in two different ports equipped with measurement equipment of different accuracy, 
the consignment in the port with the least effective equipment will have easier access to market than 
26 
 
the consignment unfortunate enough to pass the other port. In this case, the NTM becomes an NTB 
– and illegal under WTO law – due to poor implementation. 
In short, NTB identification is a complex undertaking often involving technical and legal expertise. 
For the rest of this section, consider a hypothetical African regulator tasked to identify NTBs for 
future elimination. Careful NTB identification is an important undertaking for legal reasons – the 
outcome of identification exercises are commonly used in WTO and other trade disputes – and for 
policy reform reasons too. Our regulator needs to understand the complexities involved to tailor-
make policy reform to best reduce the negative impacts of an NTB. NTBs may be identified in a 
two-stage process. First, the regulator identifies NTMs and second, distinguishes between justifiable 
NTMs and NTBs. Even the first step is a big task because NTMs are so numerous. To assist our 
African regulator (and to allow for consistent cross-country comparisons), the United Nation’s 
Multi-Agency Support Team (MAST) in 2009 developed a new classification system presented in 
Box 1. This system classifies NTMs in 16 chapters each of which are further subdivided into finer 
categories. MAST supplements its NTM classification system with a classification of procedural 
obstacles that address the implementation of an NTM rather than its design. 
The regulator may search Box 1 to identify NTMs and having found an NTM that may be a 
candidate for also being an NTB move on to the second step. That may take a while. Considering 
that procedural obstacles cut cross across many policies, it is clear that almost any policy may 
include elements fitting in one of the categories in the MAST classification – for example one 
obstacle that MAST presents is non-transparency and many policies may lack transparency and 
therefore impact trade in some way. Many of the modern regulatory issues, like sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) measures or intellectual property rights, that EAC and SADC Member States 
have recently begun to develop affect trade and may cause procedural obstacles and thus be NTBs. 
In the second step, what the regulator needs is a yardstick to differentiate between legitimate NTMs 
and illegitimate NTBs. The trade economist Robert Baldwin proposed one in 1970. He defined 
NTBs as those NTMs that decrease economic welfare (Baldwin 1970). Unfortunately for the 
regulator, this definition sounds conceptually simple but in practice it is difficult to use in its raw 
form and thus rarely an appropriate yardstick. Luckily, academics and policy practitioners have 
recently worked on improving NTB assessment methodologies (e.g. Beghin and Bureau 2001; 
Cadot, Malouche and Saez 2011; Carrere and de Melo 2009a, 2009b; and van Tongeren, Beghin, 
and Marette 2009). Our regulator may find a useful yearstick in this rapidly expanding toolbox, but 
many of the new methodologies are heavily dependent on data and expertise that our regulator may 
not have access to given that the EAC and SADC is where the regulator will apply them. 
Thus our regulator in all likelihood will be short on useful assessment methodologies but rich in 
potential NTBs. To sift through the many NTMs that have the potential to be NTBs the regulator 
likely will use a mix of common sense, consultations with knowledgeable practitioners knowing 
business, equally knowledgeable people knowing something about the technical areas in which 
NTBs are likely to be found (like food safety), selected donor-funded consultants, and some loose 
reference to the basic ideas in the definition of Baldwin (1970). 
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Box 1. MAST NTM classification system 
The Director General of UNCTAD and the WTO asked a group of eminent persons to advance 
work on non-tariff barriers. A Multi-Agency Support Team (MAST
1
) provides the technical work 
and has developed a new classification system. The system is purely descriptive and is not an 
analytical scheme. It has no prior assumptions about the effects of NTMs. The MAST list includes 
procedural obstacles relating to the implementation of measures, not the measures themselves. This 
list illustrates what kind of policy measures that may fall into the NTM category: 
A. Sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
B. Technical barriers to trade 
C. Other technical measures 
D. Price control measures 
E. Quantity control measures 
F. Para-tariff measures 
G. Finance measures 
H. Anti-competitive measures 
I. Export-related measures 
J. Trade-related investment measures 
K. Distribution restrictions 
L. Restriction on post-sales services 
M. Subsidies 
N. Government procurement restrictions 
O. Intellectual property 
P. Rules of origin 
The main headings of the classification of procedural obstacles are: 
- Arbitrariness or inconsistency 
- Discriminatory behaviour favouring specific producers or suppliers 
- Inefficiency or obstruction 
- Non-transparency 
- Legal issues 
- Unusually high fees or charges (e.g. for stamp, testing or other services rendered) 
The list only includes the main categories. See appendix 1 for a disaggregation of these. 
1
 Members of MAST include: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Trade Centre (ITC), Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the World Bank, and 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
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5.3 Typical NTBs encountered in the EAC and SADC 
Trade in Eastern and Southern Africa does not occur according to a standard textbook in trade 
economics. The trading environment is highly complex and marked by strong regulatory efforts 
despite low regulatory capacity and widespread – and often successful – attempts at avoiding 
regulation. Governments face rising demands for regulation and take upon them ever more 
challenging tasks – like advanced food safety measures – which require new forms of regulation 
often easily resisted by traders who respond by leaving format markets. This interaction between 
ambitious and often overreaching governments and entrepreneurial traders results in uneven 
implementation of trade reforms (like regional agreements), uncertainty about current rules and 
large informal trade flows. In this environment, NTBs thrive. 
Examples of NTBs can be found in nearly every NTM category identified in the MAST 
classification system as demonstrated in the works of the recent surge in policy work on NTBs in 
the EAC and SADC. In essence, nearly all regulatory activities may be either designed to trouble 
traders or implemented to this end. To give the reader a flavour of what NTBs in Eastern and 
Southern Africa look like, in this section, we briefly present typical NTBs observed in the region. 
Customs administration 
Customs revenues remain important to EAC and SADC countries although the composition of this 
revenue is naturally changing with the liberalisation of regional trade. Traders frequently complain 
of prolonged formalities, duplication of clearance processes, erroneous valuation of goods for 
customs purposes, badly functioning pre-shipment procedures, limited border post capacity and the 
presence of multiple agencies at the border posts doing seemingly identical tasks (Imani 
Development 2007, World Bank 2008). 
Technical regulations 
Goods and services frequently conform to exacting specifications which may differ across markets. 
Sometimes the differences are justified by changing local context and sometimes they are 
deliberately put in place to keep the imports out or end up having that effect because no one thought 
about the consequences of having different specifications that may origin in historical practices or 
result from mere coincidence. For example, the EAC has adopted a 3-axle – 7 tonne per axle load 
requirement for trucks which has been duly implemented by Tanzania. The remaining 4 Partner 
States, however, continue to allow 4-axle trucks carrying much heavier loads causing troubles for 
trucks crossing borders (World Bank 2008). 
SPS measures 
These measures protect human, animal and plant health but may also protect selected bureaucratic 
interests or well-connected businessmen. SPS measures tend to require advanced forms of 
regulation difficult to fit to the local African context. Codex Alimentarius standards and models of 
SPS management conceived in high income countries may cause conflicts and NTBs when 
introduced uncritically in the EAC and SADC. Such advanced regulations also cause confusion 
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exemplified by food regulation in Tanzania where the Tanzania Bureau of Standards and the 
Tanzanian Food Safety Authority have fought over the right to regulate food by imposing each their 
own set of measures requiring traders to pay for double testing and certification (World Bank 2005). 
Import and export licensing and permits 
For various reasons, trade of some products operate under licensing schemes and require the issue 
of permits even if totally free from tariffs. Often such licensing schemes are justified with reference 
to public health, animal and plant health issues. World Bank (2011) reports that Zambian import 
permits on meat, milk, and vegetables cost Shoprite US$ 20,000 per week. 
Road blocks 
Multiple policy road blocks on popular transit roads for regional trade are a hotly debated issue 
especially among EAC Partner States. The costs and annoyance caused is illustrated by a 
transporter operating in Kenya quoted in World Bank (2008): “Policy check points have become 
‘police cash-point’ as they no longer ser their intended purpose of security but are being used as 
medium of soliciting money from transit trailer trucks, especially those with foreign registration 
numbers” (World Bank 2008, p. 29). 
Rules of Origin 
To exploit the tariff preferences granted under SADC’s Free Trade Agreement, SADC firms must 
use certificates in origin managed under a highly bureaucratic scheme. World Bank (2011) reports 
that Shoprite – a South African supermarket chain - spends US$ 6 million per year administering 
the complex certificates of origin to secure US$ 14 million in duty savings under the SADC Trade 
Protocol. Woolworth – another large South African supermarket chain – finds the bureaucratic costs 
of using the Trade Protocol too large and simply does not use preferences at all. 
Visa requirements 
Cumbersome procedures and excessive visa fees reduce the mobility of African businessmen. For 
example, the latest status report on EAC NTBs issued by the EAC Secretariat observes several 
neighbouring states complaint about high charges of Tanzanian business visas (EAC Secretariat 
2012).  
Import bans 
Import bans still occur frequently in both Eastern and Southern Africa. Exporters in the EAC, for 
example, have complained on Uganda banning the import of beef and beef products from Kenya 
and on Kenyan banning imports from Uganda of day old chicks (EAC Secretariat 2012). 
Presumably these bans are justified by reference to food safety and animal health issues, yet import 
bans may be issued for many other reasons. 
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Government procurement 
In most African economies the government is the single largest buyer of goods and services and in 
many government owned monopoly firms play an important role. Therefore, discrimination by a 
government – desiring to buy domestically produced goods even if these are of inferior quality or 
more costly than imported ones – can be a powerful NTB. Imani Development (2007) speculates 
that the Black Economic Empowerment criteria that South Africa has used to promote economic 
diversification may affect government procurement and therefore could constitute an NTB. 
Domestic content requirements 
A government may restrict imports and promote domestic production – typically in the intention of 
conducting industrial policy like import substation – by setting requirements for the percentage of a 
product’s raw material that has to be sourced domestically. Tanzania, for example, is reported to 
require that 75% of the tobacco in cigarettes sold in the country has to be of Tanzanian origin (EAC 
Secretariat 2012). 
Single channel marketing 
Historically, many State Trading Enterprises existed in Eastern and Southern Africa although the 
liberalisation that most of the countries in the region have committed to over the last decades has 
greatly reduced their numbers. But some still exist and practice single channel marketing. Through 
this means the government may discriminate between importers by directing purchases. Zimbabwe 
is an example of a country that continues to procure maize in this fashion (Imani Development 
2007). 
Corruption 
Allegations of corruption weave through most NTB issues. Corruption may turn even well intended 
policy measures into NTBs and may be practiced by low as well as high level official. The low 
level official typified by the police officer that demands petty bribes to let trucks through road 
blocks and the top level by the politician that secures market shares for the family-owned business 
by keeping foreign competitors out. Especially high level corruption may severely compromise 
NTB reform efforts. Consider a dairy company using its political connection to protect its home 
market. Its political protector may impose a wide range of NTBs ranging from road blocks on major 
transport corridors into the country over influencing the issue of import licensing to elaborating new 
technical specifications on quality designed to make competing products less attractive. Such 
political interference cannot be targeted by traditional NTB reform. Traditionally, NTBs are 
targeted and removed one at a time. But the successful removal of road blocks will only result in 
increased use of the alternative instruments (misuse of import licensing or technical specifications). 
The appropriate policy response to high level corruption is governance reform that is even more 
challenging than removing NTBs. 
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Trade costs 
Infrastructural bottlenecks like the ports of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam are frequent sources of 
complaints. Costs of infrastructure and many other similar costs of moving a product from A to B 
are called “trade costs”. In a global review of the literature on trade costs, Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2004) conclude that trade costs are large – in high income countries trade costs are 
equivalent to a 170% ad valorem tax. Research cantered on Africa confirms that trade costs are very 
high in Africa too (Portugal-Perez and Wilson 2008). The observation of high African trade costs 
has led policy practitioners to conclude that Africa has to “move beyond simply signing agreements 
that reduce tariffs to drive a more holistic process to deeper regional integration” (Brenton and Isik 
2012, p. 2). 
Trade costs include all transport, border-related, and local distribution costs from the primary 
producer in the exporting country to the final consumer in the import country – including all costs 
resulting from the barriers discussed in this section. Naturally, many components of trade costs are 
influenced heavily by economic policy, but not all. Therefore trade costs are a gray area in the NTB 
discussion. While some clearly manifest the costs of NTBs, others are simply the costs of producing 
and trading. This distinction is an important one because the optimal policy response to an NTB is 
to remove it while that response does not work for the costs of producing and trading. Those costs 
must be reduced not by government changing the rules but by the private sector itself for example 
through innovation. Conceptually the distinction between NTBs as policy-induced unjustifiable 
trade costs and the rest of the big pool of trade costs may be easy to make but not so in practice. It 
often confuses businessmen and distorts the reporting of NTBs in monitoring schemes used in the 
EAC and SADC. To businessmen, any cost is a nuisance and they frequently report various costs 
they deem to be higher than they should be – like high transport costs – as NTBs. 
5.4 NTBs in the East African Community 
The evidence on NTBs in Eastern Africa consists of surveys (EABC 2004, 2006, 2008, 2011); 
World Bank 2008; Imani Development 2007) and a series of case studies, quantitative studies and 
background reports – most of which undertaken to support the implementation of the Customs 
Union and many of which are developed as part of donor projects. While the EAC Secretariat has 
been involved in many of the activities, it has not had the technical, financial and human resources 
to coordinate and lead the analytical work which different actors has done in a uncoordinated 
fashion often suffering from the conceptual difficulties we discussed in section 5.2. 
In 2003, the East African Business Council (EABC) made the first efforts to understand the nature 
and extend of NTBs in the EAC Customs Union. Responding to the establishment of the EAC 
Treaty in 2003 and anticipating the signing of the EAC Protocol for the Establishment of the EAC 
Customs Union in 2004, the EABC set up a working group that recommended actions to monitor 
and remove NTBs. This work led to the conduct of the Business Climate Survey in 2004. Later, the 
EABC published a series entitled the “Business Climate Index” studying NTBs and other 
impedients to the local business climate. In parellel with the efforts of the EABC, the consultancy 
firm Imani Development undertook a range of NTB surveys in COMESA countries including the  
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Table 6. Summary of how recent EAC surveys identify and classify NTBs 
EABC 
(2004) 
Imani Development (2007) World Bank (2008) 
Burundi Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda 
 Customs and 
administrative 
documentation 
procedures 
 Immigration 
procedures 
 Cumbersome 
inspection 
requirements 
 Police road 
blocks 
 Varying trade 
regulations 
among the three 
EAC countries 
 Varying, 
cumbersome and 
costly transiting 
procedures in the 
three EAC 
countries 
 Duplicated 
functions of 
agencies 
involved in 
verifying quality, 
quantity and 
dutiable value of 
imports and 
exports 
 Business 
registration and 
licensing 
 
 Border 
inspection 
 
 Government 
participation in 
trade and 
restrictive 
practices 
tolerated by 
governments 
 Customs and 
administrative 
entry procedures 
 SPS measures 
 TBTs 
 Other distribution 
related obstacles 
 Transiting 
procedures 
 Lack of testing 
equipment at 
Rwanda Bureau 
of Standards 
 Inadequate 
infrastructure at 
the border 
 Government 
restrictions like 
a ban on 
exporting raw 
hides and skins 
 Restrictions on 
international 
transport by 
neighbouring 
countries 
 Long and costly 
bank procedures 
 Customs and 
administrative 
entry 
procedures 
 Rwandan Rules 
of Origin 
 Border crossing 
delays 
 Cumbersome 
inspection 
requirements 
 Varying trade 
reulgations 
among EAC 
Partner States 
 Varying, 
cumbersome and 
cosly transiting 
procedures 
 Customs and 
administrative 
documentation 
procedures 
 Cumbersome 
inspection 
requirements 
 Policy road 
blocks 
 Congestion at 
Dar es Salaam 
port 
 
 Customs 
documentation 
and 
administrative 
procedures 
 Immigration 
procedures 
 Customs 
documentation 
and 
administrative 
procedures 
 Transiting 
procedures 
 Technical 
barriers to trade 
 
A. Generic NTMs: 
 Customs and 
administrative entry and 
passage procedures 
 Government 
participation in trade 
and restrictive practices 
tolerated by it 
 Distribution constraints 
 Specific limitations 
(e.g. business visa fees, 
business registration 
procedures) 
B. Product-specific NTMs: 
 Technical quality 
standards and SPS 
measures 
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five EAC Partner States. These surveys were undertaken under a project called the “Regional Trade 
Facilitation Programme”, funded by the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), 
and took place between 2004 and 2006. The World Bank also attempted to develop an overview of 
NTBs in a 2008 study done on request from the EAC Secretariat. 
Despite the wealth of recent surveys, our knowledge on the prevalence and severity of East African 
NTBs remains imperfect. Table 6 presents the surveys’ conclusions on the most important 
categories of NTBs observed in the EAC. EABC (2004) and World Bank (2008) present 
conclusions for the region as a whole, while Imani Development (2007) lists the major NTBs by 
Partner State. What emerges from Table 6 is a muddled, inconsistent picture. The studies conclude 
differently on what are the most severe NTBs. For example, World Bank (2008) emphasizes 
“Technical quality standards and SPS measures”, a category judged of lesser importance in the two 
other surveys. On the other hand, EABC (2004) finds that “Police road blocks” to be among the 
biggest NTBs, an issue discussed in the World Bank report but not found to be a big enough issue 
to appear on the list of the most serious NTBs. 
Conceptual and methodological problems disturb the clear picture. While all three surveys identify 
numerous NTBs – all very context and product specific – they lack the metrics to know whether 
NTBs are large or small. While advanced quantification methodologies have been developed they 
fit the need of consultants tasked with the study of multiple countries with few data on a tight 
budget poorly. In all three surveys, the consultants analyzing NTBs use private sector perceptions as 
the base for NTB identification. Naturally, businessmen might perceive obstacles differently and 
may even think differently on what can reasonably be called an NTB. What the consultants might 
call a legitimate NTM might be labelled an NTB by a local businessman paying the cost of a 
particular barrier without appreciating that it meets a legitimate regulatory objective. Without 
quantification the consultants are caught between a rock and a hard place. Comparing the costs of 
an NTM with its benefits would theoretically allow the consultants to use, for example, Baldwin’s 
definition of an NTB as a barrier reducing global welfare. But in practice the consultants have no 
choice than to rely on the businessmen’s perception potentially adjusted by some common sense 
reasoning of their own. Unavoidable this approach may rely excessively on anecdotes and be 
vulnerable to capture by the most vocal actors. So in this setting, that different surveys fail to reach 
consensus on the severity of NTBs despite covering the same countries at the same time is logical. 
What emerges clearly from the surveys is that the private sector identifies many NTBs. The surveys 
are just not always able to tell exactly where these NTBs are and rarely how important they are. 
The EAC secretariat together with the EABC used the initial work in EABC (2004) to respond to a 
specific obligation of the Customs Union Protocol. In Article 13 EAC politicians had agreed to 
eliminate existing NTBs and abstain from imposing new ones. To implement this commitment, the 
EAC has created transparency meachanisms in the form of notification systems like National 
Monitoring Committees and the publication of specific NTBs. The notification system use the 
Business Climate Survey and NTB inventories later developed by the National Monitoring 
Committees. 
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Box 2. EAC Categories for Non-Tariff Barriers 
 Category A: NTBs with a low political and economic complexity and a low impact on EAC 
trade. Immediate action required, consensus reached at EAC Council. 
 Category B: NTBs with a low political and economic complexity and a high impact on EAC 
trade. Short term (1-6 months) EAC Council consensus but no agreement on implementation. 
 Category C: NTBs with a high political and economic complexity and a high impact on EAC 
trade. Medium term (6-12 months) No political consensus at EAC Council. 
 Category D: NTBs with a high political and economic complexity and a low impact on EAC 
trade. Long term (>12 months) No political consensus at EAC Council. 
 
 
 
Article 13 demands more than notification. It stipulates that the Partner States create a mechanism 
‘for identifying and monitoring the removal of non-tariff barriers’. Therefore the EAC adopted a 
Time-bound Programme for the Elimination of Identified Non-Tariff Barriers in 2009 (EAC 
Secretariat 2009). The Programme classifies identified NTBs into four categories as witnessed in 
Box 2. The criteria for the four categories were the political and economic complexities involved in 
NTB reform and the trade impact of the NTBs. Essentially, the programmes aims at identifying 
quick wins in NTB reform by targetting the least controversial barriers first thereby building 
momentum to reform the more difficult NTBs at a later stage. The criteria the EAC used to 
categorize NTBs are rather opaque but presumably the categorization is based on informal 
discussions and final categorization reached through consensus-based decision-making. 
The transparancy mechanisms have successfully raised the awareness of NTBs and put them higher 
on the policy-makers’ agenda while policy practitioners question the success of the NTB removal 
mechanism. In an Africa Trade Policy Note published by the World Bank, Kirk (2010) recognizes 
the considerable efforts the EAC Secretariat has made in identifying NTBs while observing that 
“[m]oving from identifying NTBs to their reduction and removal has proven to be more challenging” 
and even concludes that the current approach has “failed to yield significant progress”. Yet, the 
EAC Secretariat itself declares partial success by emphasising the removal of selected NTBs in 
regular reports on NTB reform. According to media reports, leading East African politicians, 
observers and policy-makers frequently concur with Kirk (2010) and call for more effective 
approaches to NTB removal. 
Kirk (2010) argues that even NTBs in category A have proven very difficult to remove. This 
difficulty is linked to the nature of many common NTBs. These are NTBs that address legitimate 
objectives, exemplified by food safety, yet are either misused to deliberately hinder trade or simply 
poorly designed and therefore disturbing trade accidentially. He hypothesizes that Partner States 
struggle with designing less trade restrictive measures when legitimate objectives are involved. To 
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understand this hypothesis, we consider import bans for animal products (milk, day old chicks, beef 
and poultry) as a typical example of an EAC NTBs in category A. Legitimate public health 
measures regulate the trade of animal products in many countries. But many countries apply less 
restrictive measures than bans to regulate the public health hazards involved. Beef imports into the 
EU, for example, necessitates EU approval of the relevant parts of the exporting country’s human 
and animal health systems. Rather than facing a ban, the exporting country may seek to upgrade its 
beef export system to EU standards to gain EU market access. To implement such alternatives to 
import bans requires high levels of human and technical expertise often absent in East Africa. To 
make matters worse, most existing alternative measures target high income country problems using 
their problem-solving capacities while few measures exists that would be easy to deploy in the low 
and middle income countries of East Africa. Thus in summary many NTBs in category A address 
legitimate objectives but replacing them requires expertise and alternative measures rarely available. 
Kirk (2010) acknowledges that Partner States agree in general to remove obvious protectionist 
measures yet observes that they fail to agree on how to replace NTBs.The lack of commonly agreed 
and less trade restrictive measures appropriate for East Africa prevents Partner States from reaching 
consensus. Complicating the consensus-making process, NTBs addressing legitimate objectives 
have a high potential for non-transparent and discriminatory application. The lack of expertise, the 
limited availability of specifications of commonly available alternative measures, and the high 
potential for misuse of such alternative measures have so far blocked policy reform of the identified 
NTBs in the EAC. 
The EAC Secretariat challenges the view of Kirk (2010). In the publications of regional forums on 
NTBs and status reports, it maintains that the NTB mechanism has removed many NTBs. The EAC 
Secretariat convenes yearly regional forums where National Monitoring Committee members and 
representatives from the EABC, the EAC Secretariat itself and donor agencies meet. The sixth such 
forum was held in March 2012. Recently the EAC Secretariat began publishing reports on the status 
of NTB removal. The first status report was issued in August 2011 with the second report published 
in March 2012 (respectively EAC Secretariat 2011, 2012). The second status report from March 
2012 list 26 NTBs reported to have been removed and stated that Partner States have reached 
decisions to be implemented soon on at least another 12 NTBs. New NTBs however frequently 
surface and many are left unresolved from previous reports (EAC Secretariat 2012). 
Reviewing the accuracy of the reporting of the status of NTBs in EAC Secretariat publications 
would be a costly and time consuming exercise beyond the Terms of Reference of the present study. 
However, we do observe that some of the NTBs reported solved by the EAC Secretariat look 
problematic. For example, delays in the ports of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam – gateways for all 
Partner States to international markets – have long been regarded as one of the most severe NTB in 
East Africa. The EAC Secretariat now reports that this NTB has been removed in its most recent 
status report (EAC Secretariat 2012). The EAC Secretariat states that new documentation processes 
in the form of National Single Window systems and investment in cargo handling have solved the 
problem. Yet, in the very same status report, Rwanda is reported to raise a new NTB in the form of 
congestion in the ports of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam. This new NTB appear to be the same as the 
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one allegedly removed. Noteworthy, the EAC Secretariat is surprisingly optimistic regarding this 
new NTB. The EAC Secretariat foresees that this new NTB will be removed in June 2012 in the 
case of Mombasa and December the same year in the case of Dar es Salaam by the port authorities 
installing new equipment to offload and load goods. The optimism of the EAC Secretariat is 
remarkable given the decade-long challenge of reforming the operation of East African ports. 
As part of the analytical efforts to understand East African NTBs, the surveys have been 
supplemented by sectoral and issue-focused case studies often funded under donor projects. Such 
in-depth work is typified by the Regional Agricultural Trade Expansion Programme (RATES). 
RATES was a USAID-funded project supporting the integration of East African agricultural 
markets. RATES (2004) analyzed regional dairy trade and found NTBs to be a significant problem. 
One particular problem observed was that differing national dairy standards required duplicate and 
costly testing and certification. RATES assumed, and the EAC Secretariat and Partner State 
ministries agreed, that the harmonization of common EAC standards with international standards 
would eliminate the need for duplicative testing and certification. Subsequently, as a tool to remove 
NTBs, RATES supported the development and implementation of new harmonized EAC standards 
based on international ones. 
In a study produced for the World Bank, Jensen and Keyser (2010) challenge this understanding of 
NTBs in regional dairy trade. They find that the new harmonized dairy standards produced under 
the RATES project are more likely to present new NTBs than to remove them. The international 
standards on which new harmonized EAC standards are based have been developed for high income 
countries with different production capacities and consumption habits. For example, the new EAC 
standard for raw milk does not take into account that raw milk in East Africa is boiled before 
consumption and that the imposition of very strict bacteria count limits will effectually ban most 
milk as the production and trading structure is immature for such demanding requirements. The 
boiling before consumption habit effectively reduces the food safety hazard to very low levels 
which the excessive bacterial count limit threatens the viability of the East Africa dairy industry. 
The new harmonized EAC dairy standards are a mismatch for the local context. Curiously, the new 
EAC raw milk standard neither serve a legitimate policy objective – because it does not improve 
food safety – nor facilitate trade – because the low bacterial counts prescribed in the new standard 
are very difficult and costly to comply with for the East African dairy industry thus making most 
milk technically illegal.  
Despite the difficulties of measuring, ranking, and reforming NTBs met so far, the Partner States 
continue to seek to accelerate NTB work. Most recently, the EAC has commissioned study funded 
by the German development aid agency called GIZ to develop a legally binding enforcement 
mechanism for elimination of NTBs. This study should develop a Draft Bill on a legally binding 
enforcement mechanism including an arbitration process by May 2012 (EAC Secretariat 2012). 
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Table 7. Nature and severity of NTBs in SADC Member States 
Measure SADC Member States 
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Import bans 1 3 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 
Restrictive charges 
(not import or export 
duties) 
3 1 1 1 2 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Import and export 
quotas 
1 2 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 1 1 2 
Export licensing 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 
Single channel 
marketing 
4 2 1 2 3 2 2 1 3 2 1 3 
Transit charges 3 3 1 2 1 4 2 2 1 3 2 2 
Technical regulations 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 2 2 
Visa requirements 4 3 3 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 
Import licensing 4 3 2 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 
Customs procedures 
and documentation 
5 2 3 3 1 5 3 2 3 4 3 3 
Note: 5: Very serious; 4: Serious; 3: Moderate; 2: Low; 1: Nil. 
Source: Charalambides (2010), table 7. 
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5.5 NTBs in the Southern African Development Community 
Two primary sources produce data on NTBs in SADC. One source is the survey produced by the 
DFID-funded “Regional Trade Facilitation Programme” which surveyed NTBs in COMESA 
countries 2004 and 2006 – including SADC countries (Imani  Development 2007). The survey 
results were analysed in depth in a background paper to a 2011 World Bank report on regional 
integration in Southern Africa (World Bank 2011), this background paper is entitled “Addressing 
NTBs in regional goods trade among Southern African Countries” (Charalambides 2010). The other 
source is the data reported to an NTB Monitoring System developed with DFID support for online 
reporting of NTBs in the Tripartite Region covering SADC, COMESA and EAC. 
Charalambides (2010) seeks to assess the severity of NTBs in SADC. He ranks the various 
categories of NTBs observed in the survey described in Imani Development (2007) which we also 
used before in the discussion of NTBs in East Africa. He uses a simple scale of severity going from 
5 to 1 with 5 equalling very serious NTBs and 1 meaning that the measure has no negative impact. 
This ranking is presented in table 7. His methodology is highly subjective and apparently based on 
his own common sense reasoning rather than any formal evidence that one measure is more 
restrictive than the other. While his methodology successfully presents the range of NTBs observed, 
it fails in identifying clearly which NTBs are the most restrictive. Imani Development (2007) itself 
does not conclude on the severity of NTBs in SADC but merely lists the various types encountered 
in the survey. 
A study by the World Bank on Southern African regional trade (World Bank 2011) draws on the 
recently created NTB Monitoring System to identify the areas where firms complain that they 
encounter NTBs. This evidence is presented in table 8. 
 
Table 8. NTBs identified in complaints to the NTB Monitoring System 
Barrier Examples of products affected Intra-SADC trade potentially 
affected (% of total) 
Import bans, quotas & levies Wheat, poultry, flour, meat, 
maize, UHT milk, sugar 
6.1% 
Preferences denied Salt, fishmeal, pasta 0.4% 
Import permits & levies UHT milk, bread, eggs, sugar, 
cooking oil, maize, oysters 
5.4% 
Single marketing channels Wheat, meat, dairy, maize, tea, 
tobacco 
5.3% 
Rules of origin Textiles and clothing, palm oil, 
soap, cake decorations, curry 
powder, wheat flour 
3.0% 
Export taxes Dried beans, sheep, wood 4.8% 
Source: World Bank (2011), table 2. 
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Evidently, the NTB categories identified in Charalambides (2010) and World Bank (2011) overlap 
considerable; preferences and rules of origin are the only novelties in the latter study. These 
measures were not significant when the base survey for Charalambides (2010) was done because 
the SADC FTA was not yet fully implemented then. 
World Bank (2011) ambitiously estimates the aggregate impact of the identified NTBs. This 
estimate exploits two sources: first a recent global survey of NTB costs (Carrère and De Melo 
2009a, b) that calculates an average 40% tariff equivalent of NTBs, and second the firm complaints 
on SADC NTBs as reported in table 8. World Bank (2011) makes “the rather weak assumption that 
the distribution of NTBs in SADC is the same as in the rest of the world (i.e. with a 40 percent ad 
valorem equivalence)” and multiplies these 40% with the value of trade potentially affected by 
NTBs – a figure of US$ 3.3 billion representing the total intra-SADC trade of the products reported 
in table 8 – to reach a crude estimate of 40% of US$ 3.3 billion or “around US$1.3 billion per year 
– equivalent to more than half of the GDP of Lesotho” (World Bank 2011: 26)”. 
But what does this estimate represent? World Bank (2011) calls it a “cost estimate”, however had 
the calculations involved a tariff and not a tariff equivalent, it would have been clear the US$ 1.3 
billion is something else. In that case, 40% times a trade flow of US$ 3.3 billion would yield – not 
the costs of the tariff – but the tariff revenue of US$ 1.3 billion. To economists, a tariff revenue is a 
transfer from producers and consumers to the government and not a cost to the economy as a whole. 
The cost is the deadweight loss caused by disturbing producers’ and consumers’ incentives. To 
calculate this cost, World Bank (2011) would need to apply much more advanced methods 
involving the shapes of supply and demand curves. So, in conclusion, this type of back-of-the-
envelope calculations produces a figure that is highly uncertain due to the data problems and close 
to meaningless due to the flawed methodology. 
Keane et al (2010) represents a more advanced attempt to assess quantitative effects of NTBs on 
intra-regional imports for several SADC countries, including Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa. 
Results from their analysis show that the presence of one or more NTB for a SADC country 
severely reduces its imports from other SADC countries but increases its imports from non-SADC 
countries, suggesting that NTBs indeed reduce intra-regional trade in the SADC region, possibly 
due to the fact that SADC countries are less able to adjust to these NTBs or these NTBs are 
imposed on products where intra-SADC trade are concentrated. 
Article 6 of the SADC Trade Protocol stipulates that all Member States must adopt and implement 
policies to eliminate current NTBs on intra-regional trade and abstain from introducing new ones. 
SADC has also adopted special protocols – which the Member States have not implemented fully – 
on SPS measures and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs) to reduce any negative impacts on trade 
from standards and similar instruments. The efforts by SADC to identify and remove NTBs run in 
parallel to efforts at the Tripartite level. The Member States of SADC, EAC and COMESA 
emphasized NTB removal at the first Tripartite Summit in October 2008. The DFID-funded 
TradeMark Southern Africa supported the development of a web-based reporting, monitoring and 
elimination mechanism accessible at www.tradebarriers.org. Member States created National 
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Monitoring Committees with members from both the public and private sector, to monitor NTBs at 
the national level and to resolve registered NTB complaints. 
The system went on-line in 2009 and after a slow start was increasingly used to report NTBs in 
2010 and 2011. TradeMark Southern Africa states in early 2011 that the system is commonly used 
and succeeds in revolving the majority of NTB complaints although the “resolution processes are 
lengthy as communication goes back and forth between focal points, REC [Regional Economic 
Community] NTB units and the reporting stakeholder. The average period it takes to resolve a NTB 
is three months. However urgent NTBs are resolved somewhat faster than this average” (TMSA 
2011, p. 4). 
The USAID-funded Southern Africa Trade Hub-project monitors the implementation of the SADC 
Trade Protocol. Its 2011 annual monitoring report (SATH 2011) questions the success that 
TradeMark Southern Africa has observed. By mid 2011, of the 329 NTBs reported in the system, 
227 – or 69% – were registered as resolved. SATH (2011) discussed the individual NTBs reported. 
It concludes that resolved NTBs fall in one of four categories: Some describe outdated or non 
existing issues. Others cannot be verified because they contain too little information or are highly 
subjective, including impossible-to-verify language like complaining that costs are “too high” or 
procedures are “cumbersome”. Others again, are about trade facilitation like ports and custom. 
Finally, the last category includes reportedly resolved complaints clearly not resolved. For example, 
a ban on the import of wheat flour into Namibia was registered as solved despite the government 
had done nothing else than simply acknowledging the receipt of the complaint and the existing of 
the ban. 
The Tripartite’s NTB Monitoring Mechanism suffers from the difficulties of distinguishing between 
NTBs and trade costs. Infrastructure complaints are frequently registered but many may not be 
NTBs but rather a reflection of the poor state of the regions infrastructure. If SADC had the 
analytical capability to properly identify NTBs the credibility of the mechanism would be greatly 
enhanced. 
5.6 Summary 
Both the EAC and SADC have successfully reduced tariffs and although this policy reform does not 
seem to influence the trade statistics – at least not yet – it has created a demand for alternative 
protectionist instruments. 
Work to gauge the depth of the NTB problem in the EAC and SADC has primarily relied on 
surveys and reporting mechanisms in both cases building on the perceptions of the business 
community. While perceptions may be the best available source of information, they are prone to 
misunderstandings about NTBs which are often technical in nature and may have effects not easy to 
detect. Theoretically, better information could be developed using some of the advanced 
methodologies recently developed by academics to measure NTB impact. But these have rarely 
found their way into policy work in the EAC and SADC. Such methodologies appear too 
demanding in data and analytical skills. The EAC and SADC Secretariats and the public 
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administrations in the member countries have little or no analytical capacity to identify NTBs and 
measure their impact. Even the World Bank has struggled in NTB identification in a recent study on 
NTBs in the EAC (World Bank 2008). 
Our knowledge on NTBs in the EAC and SADC is imperfect. NTBs are likely very numerous and 
the recent literature has clearly illustrated many examples. But knowledge is lacking on the trend, 
the impact and on how to set priorities. In this report, the available evidence cannot answer 
questions like: Are NTBs multiplying and getting more onerous? How much trade and potential 
income is lost to NTBs? How do we rank the severity of the NTBs observed? To discover this state 
of knowledge may be surprising to the outsider watching the intense publication activity on NTBs 
in the EAC and SADC including four recent World Bank reports (Brenton and Isik 2012, World 
Bank 2008, 2011, 2012). But much of the knowledge presented in World Bank reports and 
elsewhere refers back to the same basic surveys and NTB reporting mechanisms that we have 
reviewed in this study. Thus policy work to curtail NTBs must operate without all the answers to 
questions of NTB trends, severity and priority. 
The NTB challenge is particularly large when introducing modern regulation like food safety 
measures and technical standards. These instruments address legitimate objectives but may be 
poorly designed or implemented thus harming trade without the intended positive effects. Existing 
models like the harmonization of standards to reform NTBs may work poorly if not tailor-made to 
the African context. 
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6 Opportunities and challenges of a liberalization of services, investment and 
government procurement proposed under the EAC and SADC EPAs 
The EU has negotiated EPAs with six regional configurations of ACP countries since 2003 but has 
met great resistance from most.
3
 One of the contentious issues is the concept of ‘comprehensive 
EPAs’. The EU insists that the EPAs should be comprehensive in the sense that they should cover 
both merchandise trade and areas like services, government procurement and investment. The 
reasons put forward by the EU for ‘comprehensive’ EPAs were to build the new trade relationship 
on a broader and more solid basis of trade rules and regulations than can be achieved through tariff 
reductions alone. The EU argues that additional chapters containing regulations for trade and 
investment would contribute to strengthening the enabling environment for trade and make ACP 
regions more attractive for investors.  Together with fostering regional integration this would 
contribute to achieving the ultimate objective of development and poverty alleviation. For the EU, 
the inclusion of service, investment and government procurement hence became one of the 
cornerstones of the ‘development dimension’ of EPAs. 
In general, the interim EPAs signed by EAC and SADC do not contain specific provisions on 
service, investment and procurement issues. In fact, the only EPA that spells out detailed text on 
these issues is the EPA agreed with the Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM) of 16 Caribbean 
countries. Therefore, the following discussion tries to draw on whatever general text there is in the 
interim EPAs and also refers to the relevant CARIFORUM text on these issues for discussion future 
perspectives in the negotiations of the final EPAs for the EAC and SADC regions. 
6.1 Services liberalization 
There are many perceived benefits from service liberalization in the context of EPA negotiations. 
Countries can use service liberalizations to lock in existing levels of openness in service sectors and 
to further enhance the credibility of service sector reforms and provide signals to foreign investors 
for attracting investment in service sectors. Since many of the EAC and SADC countries lack the 
necessary framework for regulations of service sectors, service sector liberalizations can also lead to 
increased quality and credibility of service sector regulations. In areas of particular importance to 
the EAC and SADC regions (such as travel and tourism), liberalizations would allow African firms 
to better compete with their EU counterparts. Including service in the EPA agreement also requires 
regional cooperation in harmonizing service sector regulations, which in turn can widen and deepen 
regional integrations in the service sectors (Brenton et al. 2010).   
Despite these potential benefits from service liberalization, some concerns have also been expressed 
with widening the scope of the EPA negotiations from trade liberalization in goods. The main 
concern is about the competitions from EU service providers in domestic markets in the EAC and 
SADC countries, as many of the countries in these regions do not have a competitive modern 
service sector and/or only possess limited capacity in some specific service sectors. In return for 
                                                          
3
 See European Parliament (2011) for the key facts and issues of the EU-ACP EPA negotiations. Bilal and Braun-
Munzinger (2008) offers a summary of the contentious issues in the EPA negotiations, as does South Centre (2010).   
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opening up to service providers from the EU, these countries will not be able to make comparable 
inroads in the EU service markets, due to their limited capacity. Therefore, it is suspected that any 
increased service trade liberalization will necessarily benefit EU service providers more than those 
from the EAC and SADC countries. 
In the SADC interim EPA agreement, the negotiations parties commit themselves to stick to their 
respective rights and obligations under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) of the 
WTO.  In addition, they agree to negotiate progressive liberalization with substantial sectoral 
coverage within a period of three years following the conclusion of the full EPA; but not to 
introduce new and more discriminatory measures to third parties as specified in Article V.1.b (ii) 
GATS, for all services sectors; and to have a liberalization schedule for one service sector for each 
participating SADC EPA State by 31 December 2008. Furthermore, the EU agreed to support 
capacity building aimed at strengthening the regulatory framework of the participating SADC EPA 
States. Judging from the above text, it is not possible to make a concrete appraisal on the 
opportunities and challenges of prospective service liberalizations in a final EPA agreement for the 
SADC region. Assuming that similar clauses of service liberalization to the CARIFORUM EPA are 
to be achieved eventually in the final SADC-EPA, some observers suggest several avenues through 
which the SADC countries may benefit from service liberalization, including: enhanced ability to 
attract investment from the EU by liberalizing core infrastructure services; efficiency and supply 
capacity gains and improved business environment and consumer welfare gains from increased 
competitions from foreign service providers; upgrading regulatory capacity which can maximizes 
the benefits of liberalization; and potential gains associated with better access to the EU market in 
Mode 4 (independent professionals not linked to commercial presence and semi-skilled and 
unskilled labour).
4
  
6.2 Government procurement 
Government procurement is important for the EAC and SADC regions, as it constitutes as much as 
10% of GDP and up to 70% of public expenditure in many of these countries (Woolcock 2008). 
Opening up government procurement in the EAC and SADC regions would introduce them to 
transparent procurement procedures/rules and actual liberalizations, which in turn would in 
principle lead to government revenue savings, benefits from foreign competitions, as well as 
avoidance of corruptions and vested interests. It is generally believed that integrated regional 
procurement market built upon similarly transparent procurement rules and procedures is more 
desirable than closed national markets. Therefore, opening up procurement markets across a whole 
region would enhance regional integration. However, giving these countries’ supply constraints and 
the openness of the EU market, actual opening of procurement market in the EPA agreement would 
imply larger liberalization by the EAC and SADC regions in their respective EPA negotiations, thus 
leading to asymmetric market access opportunities to firms from EAC and SADC regions and those 
from the EU. 
                                                          
4
 See discussions contained in Khumalo (2009), and Sauve and Ward (2009). 
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It should be noted that past reforms in Africa in government procurement have largely been driven 
by external forces, such as the need to comply with expectations of donors (see e.g. Evenett 2003). 
This means that it would be difficult to maintain reform momentum once the pressure from donors 
is off. Therefore, the EPA negotiations in this area should be mainly aiming at establishing 
transparent policy framework rules rather than specifying liberalization schedules, which would 
remedy the incentive issues related to maintaining national reform processes needed for 
implementing the bilateral obligations contained in the EPA agreement. 
Currently, only the CARIFORUM EPA contains provisions on procurement and the actual 
liberalization schedule is to be further negotiated. In the case of the interim EPAs agreed to by the 
EAC and the SADC countries, very little has been said on government procurement, with the EAC 
interim EPA stating the need to include procurement in a final agreement and the SADC interim 
EPA not even containing similar text.  
Specific concerns facing the EAC and SADC countries in adopting relevant CARIFORUM EPA 
text in the procurement negotiations are related to the reduction of the so-called “policy space” and 
the compliance costs for adopting transparent framework rules (Dawar and Evenett 2009). The 
former concerns the reduction of policy scope for some countries to use preferential procurement 
treatment for implementing development and/or for infant industry strategies, whereas the latter are 
related to mobilize economic resource in setting up the framework rules and in actually 
implementing those rules.  
Because of these opportunities and challenges, countries in the two regions will be impacted 
differently by the potential inclusion of government procurement in the final EPAs. For instance, 
(Woolcock 2008) points out that South Africa will have to consider how framework rules on 
government procurement influence its ability to apply preferential treatment to promote 
development and industrial objectives in the longer run, even though there should not be immediate 
impact on policy space reductions if CARIFORUM type of text is to be adopted. In the case of 
Uganda, there appears to be major challenges in implementing framework rules and in coping with 
possible compliance costs. Regarding policy space, even if Uganda wants to deal with the issue of 
reduction of policy space, the very concept of “policy space” has yet to be clearly defined before 
remedial actions can be proposed to avoid such an outcome. 
6.3 Investment 
The inclusion of a comprehensive investment agreement in the EPAs is believed to be able to result 
in the realization of a host of objectives from the perspective of EAC and SADC countries. For 
instance, such an investment agreement will achieve greater predictability and transparency for 
investment to flow from the EU into the recipient regions in Africa. It will offer greater security for 
investors and their investments (investor protection). It will also establish rules that are supportive 
of more favourable market access rights and help establish a broad based investment regime that is 
conducive to the technological development and social transformation in Africa (for example, 
greater employment). 
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In the EAC interim EPA, there is no commitment in the framework agreement for the final EPA to 
contain a chapter on commercial presence; however, there is a requirement set out in Article 37, the 
Rendezvous Clause, that Parties build on “progress made in the negotiation of a comprehensive 
EPA text”. This provision, which comprises Chapter V of the agreement, sets out areas where the 
parties will continue negotiations, and includes trade in services and investment and private sector 
development. Elsewhere in the interim agreement there are also several other references to 
investment, although there is no mentioning what kind of investment agreement will be negotiated. 
Likewise in the interim EPA between the SADC EPA countries and the EU initiated on 23 
November, 2007, investment is also mentioned but without any specifics. For instance, Article 1 of 
the interim agreement includes amongst the objectives of the EPA “supporting the conditions for 
increasing investment and private sector initiative”. The agreement also establishes a timetable for 
future negotiations on investment, but only for a subset of countries within the SADC grouping. 
Furthermore, Article 67 also commits the Parties to negotiating an Investment Chapter no later than 
31 December 2008. It stipulates that negotiations take into account relevant provisions of the SADC 
Protocol on Finance and Investment and that the EU provide adequate technical assistance to 
facilitate negotiations and implementation of the Investment Chapter (see Mangeni, 2009).  
Due to the lack of specifics on the nature and scope of the envisioned investment chapter in the two 
interim EPAs, the CARIFORUM EPA negotiations and agreement offer some useful hints on how 
the EAC and SADC regions might want to manage the perceived opportunities and challenges 
associated with investment negotiations in their EPA negotiations. The key message from the 
experience of the CARIFORUM EPA negotiations is centered around securing an agreement on 
investment rules that would stimulate greater inward investment flows and that would also facilitate 
a pro-development outcome. The notion of a pro-development outcome has two dimensions 
(Westcott 2009). On the one hand, the establishment of investment rules should be conducive to 
investment flows in areas of greatest economic importance to the recipient countries. On the other 
hand, the investment agreement should allow for the reservation of the most sensitive areas of 
investment activity so as to ensure the maintenance of an effective policy space for purposes of 
national development. This latter point would imply that EAC and SADC countries need to follow 
the example of the CARIFORUM countries in declaring sensitive areas that are to be excluded from 
a final EPA investment agreement, such as the provision of public services and the provision of 
utilities. 
6.4 Summary 
The CARIFORUM EPA offers guidance on how the EAC and SADC regions might want to 
approach the negotiation of comprehensive EPAs. Both the EAC and SADC have so far been very 
reluctant to include the issues of services, government procurement and investment in EPAs. 
Theoretically, gains could be made in services. Key opportunities are improving infrastructure 
services, upgrading regulatory capacity, improving Mode 4 access, and using increased competition 
from EU service providers to improve the business climate and increase consumer welfare. The 
concept of policy space is a central issue in government procurement and investment. On 
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investment, the CARIFORUM countries have succeeded in declaring some as ‘sensitive’ and 
excluding them from the investment agreement.  
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7 Do the proposed EPAs support wider and deeper trade integration within the 
EAC and SADC countries? 
7.1 The EAC and SADC 
African countries have been mostly negotiating the EPAs with the EU on a regional basis. There 
have been several arguments suggesting the potential beneficial effects of the EPAs on the various 
regional integration processes currently taking place in Africa, including those related to the EAC, 
SADC, COMESA, and the wider Tripartite FTA encompassing the three regions, which is currently 
under negotiations.
5,6
 
First, this region-to-region approach for negotiating and signing the EPAs would help the African 
countries to rationalize and better configure their existing regional groupings. This is because a 
given country with multiple memberships in different African FTAs would have to join one 
particular group to engage in the EPA negotiations. Therefore, individual countries would have to 
choose the groups that make the most economical sense. By forming the right groups to participate 
in these negotiations, African participants in the EPA negotiations will be able to better consolidate 
their regional markets, which naturally would help regional integration. With the conclusions of the 
EPAs, many African countries would also need to conduct economic reforms as part of their EPA 
commitments. These reforms in turn would help to remove the obstacles hindering their regional 
integration processes. 
Second, the credibility of regional integration amongst African countries would be greatly improved 
if this process is tied to their commitments to the EPAs, because in this case the EU would act as an 
external guarantor not only for the commitments of the EPAs themselves but also for the regional 
integration commitments that the EPA commitments are conditional upon. 
Lastly, the EU has raised some issues in the EPA negotiations that have traditionally been excluded 
in conventional FTA negotiations, including trade in services, investment, and government 
procurements. These new issues would require the African countries to engage in wider and deeper 
economic reforms than what would be required by their own regional integration processes. If the 
EU succeeds in including these issues in the final EPAs, African countries would need to open up 
their service, investment and government procurement markets and implement market oriented 
reforms in these areas, which would then lead to wider and deeper regional integration. 
Despite these positive views on the possibility of using the EPAs to support wider and deeper trade 
integrations within Africa, including the EAC and SADC regions, considerable concerns have also 
raised on the possibility that the EPAs can also interfere and even damage the on-going regional 
integration process in Africa. These concerns are outlined as follows. 
There are many regional economic communities and subgroups in Africa with varying ambitions in 
promoting regional economic integration (Dinka and Kennes 2007, and ECDPM 2010). Many 
                                                          
5
 Summaries of these arguments can be found in e.g. Bilal and Braun-Munzinger (2008), Bilal et al. (2011). 
6
 For the relevant legal text of the EPAs concerning these regions, see European Commission (2009. 2010a, 2010b). 
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African countries, including member countries of the SADC and EAC regions, are members of 
more than one regional group. This phenomenon causes conceptual difficulties in implementations. 
For instance, when a country holds membership to two regional groups aiming at forming their own 
customs unions, this country would have to harmonize its external tariffs to the levels of the CETs 
set by both groups, which can very well be different with different implementation timetable and 
schedules, thus rendering the implementation for that country theoretically impossible. Naturally, 
exceptions and exemptions would have to be granted for this country from one or both groups, 
thereby making the implementation of the regional integration process difficult and complicated. In 
addition, multiple memberships in different groups also raise serious complexities in designing 
functioning rules of origins. Finally, when different groups advance their own regional integration 
processes at different stages and speeds and with different scopes, it would also create difficulties 
for a member country to chart the right course in committing to domestic reforms to satisfy these 
different demands. 
In the presence of complicated processes of regional integrations in Africa, it can be safely said that 
the EPA negotiations at least add further complexities for African countries to manage and advance 
their own regional integration. In fact, it can even be argued that some of the existing difficulties in 
African regional integration may be magnified rather than minimized by the EPA negotiations, as 
has been suggested by some observers (see for example Lui and Bilal 2009, South Centre 2010, 
Walker 2009).  
First, there have been some imperfect matches between EPA negotiation groupings and existing 
regional economic communities. This is both a reflection of African countries’ need to rationalize 
their grouping in responding to the opportunities and threats of the EPA negotiations and an 
indication that some of these countries may trade its commitments to certain regional groupings for 
self-interests in the EPA negotiations.  
Second, even within the same EPA negotiation group, it is possible that there exist different 
liberalization schedules and/or exclusion baskets and even nomenclatures. This may create new 
barriers for intra-regional trade in the same group. For instance, these differences may trigger 
differential rather than common external tariffs, which would further require new border controls 
and different rules of origin within the same group.  
Third, some specific clauses insisted by the EU in these negotiations may pre-empt actions aiming 
at fostering deeper regional integration and limit African countries’ ability to engaging in 
preferential trade liberalization with countries outside of the continent. For instance, the “standstill” 
clause prohibits any renegotiations with the EU when members of an EPA group need to change 
their external tariffs in order to establish a CET after an EPA agreement is reached. In the case of 
the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) clause, the possibility for African countries to conduct trade talks 
with other partners will also be limited as the EU would require any more favourable treatment 
offered by African countries to other partners to be automatically extended to the EU. Last but not 
the least, the different designations of African countries as Least-Developed countries (LDCs) and 
non-LDCs create different incentives for countries in the same negotiation groups to participate in 
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the EPA negotiations. For LDC members of an EPA group, the fall-back scenario for not signing 
the EPA is the Everything But Arms agreement (EBA) which guarantees them duty and quota-free 
access to the EU markets. For most non-LDC members, the alternative to the EPA is the less 
favourable Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) schemes for accessing the EU market. In the 
case of South Africa, the bilateral Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) would 
apply in the absence of the EPA. Because of these differences in access to alternative arrangements, 
the LDC members would have fewer incentives as compared to the non-LDC members in signing 
an EPA, thus creating potential issues in regional cooperation between LDC and non-LDC members 
of an EPA group, and in the case of SADC/SACU, between South Africa and other SADC/SACU 
members.      
More specifically for the EAC, in addition to memberships in the EAC EPA group, Burundi, 
Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya also belong to the COMESA (see Appendix A - Table 10). Indeed, 
these four countries initially participated in the COMESA-EU EPA negotiations but have since 
mid-2007 left the COMESA group and instead joined Tanzania (which is also part of the SADC) to 
negotiate the EPA under the EAC grouping. An interim EPA between the EAC and the EU was 
reached in 2007 but a final EPA has not yet been agreed upon. The complexity in the EPA 
negotiations in connection to the divide between LDC and non-LDC countries is also relevant in the 
EAC case. Among the five EAC member countries, Kenya is the only non-LDC country and thus 
has quite different incentives in reaching a final EPA as its alternative to the EAC is the GSP 
scheme, whereas in the case of the other EAC countries, their designation as LDCs would guarantee 
duty and quota free access to the EU market according to the EBA. Therefore, the process towards a 
final EPA is likely strongly driven by Kenya and by the other member countries’ desire to maintain 
good regional cooperation with Kenya. However, it would not be surprising if the LDC members of 
the EAC proceed with the negotiations of the final EPA by comparing the likely costs associated 
with agreeing to a final EPA (in terms of liberalization their own trade barriers limiting imports 
from the EU) against likely gains from further regional integration with Kenya.  
As compared to the EAC, countries in the SADC region are more diversified in terms of their 
regional integration grouping, levels of economic development, and their respective trade relations 
with the EU. As shown in Table 11 in Appendix A, the fifteen countries in the SADC region mainly 
negotiated with the EU in two EPA groups, namely the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) group 
which includes Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Seychelles, and the 
SADC group consisting of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, and 
South Africa. In addition, DRC joins the Central African EPA known by its French acronym 
CEMAC (Communauté Économique et Monétaire des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale) and Tanzania is 
a member of the EAC EPA group. Most SADC countries in the ESA-EPA group agreed to an 
interim EPA and signed the agreement in 2009 but negotiations for a comprehensive EPA are 
ongoing. In the SADC-EPA, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, and Swaziland agreed to an interim 
EPA in 2007 and signed the agreement in 2009. Namibia agreed to the interim EPA but has not yet 
signed. South Africa and Angola did not agree to the interim agreement but have joined the rest of 
the group in negotiating a comprehensive EPA. In addition to being divided into four different 
negotiation groups, the SADC countries also differ in their existing trade arrangements with the EU. 
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Eight SADC countries are designated as LDCs and thus have the access to the EBA, whereas six 
other SADC countries are not LDCs and therefore had to rely on the GSP scheme for exporting to 
the EU. In the case of South Africa, a bilateral agreement named TDCS would apply in the absence 
of an EPA. These complicated regional integration processes as well as the further differentiations 
due to the EPA negotiations have likely created tremendous difficulties for these countries to 
simultaneously sort out the best regional integration roadmap and the most beneficial EPA grouping 
strategy. 
Take SADC-EPA group, the main EPA group in the SADC region as an example. Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland have been members of SACU together with South Africa for a 
long time, with a well-established custom revenue sharing mechanism that provides much of the 
government revenues for Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. They have signed the interim 
EPA but South Africa, the dominant member of the custom union, has not reached an interim 
agreement, even though it agreed to participate in the negotiation of a comprehensive EPA. This 
situation poses potential challenges that may jeopardize the SACU as a custom union and the 
associated revenue sharing mechanism Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland have with 
South Africa. A viable alternative, as suggested by some observers, would be for the SADC-EPA 
group to align the EPA agreement with South Africa’s bilateral TDCAs. However, such a move 
might prove to be difficult for the LDC members of the group (Angola, Lesotho, and Mozambique). 
In the existing interim SADC-EPA (signed by Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique and 
agreed but not signed by Namibia), problems also exist. Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and 
Swaziland as members of the SACU, naturally agreed to one common set of liberalization schedule 
so as to preserve the integrity of the SACU CET; however, Mozambique agreed to another set of 
liberalization schedule with different implementation period. Lists of products excluded from these 
liberalization schedules also differ among the member countries. Finally, South Africa’s bilateral 
agreement with the EU contains a different set of liberalization schedule, which must be 
harmonized with those of the rest of the SADC-EPA group for the final comprehensive EPA to be 
possible and for the SACU to remain a viable customs union.  
Aside from the above principal difficulties for the EPA negotiations to coexist with regional 
integration processes in the SADC-EPA group, some technical challenges are also triggered by the 
EPA negotiations, including but not limited to: the MFN clause regarding future trade talks with 
countries outside of Africa; issues with rules of origin and cumulations; and issues beyond 
merchandise trade such as service trade and investment. The MFN clause is particularly a problem 
for South Africa as it has more diversified trade relations with non-EU countries and is more likely 
to engage in bilateral discussions with other major trading nations. Therefore, the EU’s insistence of 
enjoying the MFN treatment would severely restrict South Africa’s ability to engage in potential 
future trade talks. Rules of origin and cumulations can also become much more complicated in the 
SADC-EPA countries when multiple trade regimes (i.e. SACU, the SADC FTA, the bilateral 
TDCA involving South Africa and the EU, as well as the prospective comprehensive EPA) have to 
co-exist. Regarding service and investment issues, South Africa has potentially different interests 
from the rest of the group as it is the dominant service and investment provider in the group and 
might resist discussions with the EU to avoid weakening its position. 
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7.2 The Tripartite 
The Tripartite region of COMESA-EAC-SADC have currently been negotiating the Tripartite Free 
Trade Area since June 12, 2012, aiming at reducing and eventually eliminating tariffs in goods 
originated and traded in the region. There are 26 members in the tripartite region, with 19 member 
countries belonging to the COMESA, 15 in the SADC and 5 in the EAC region. Of the 19 
COMESA members, four of them are also members of the EAC and the EAC-EPA groups (i.e. 
Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and Kenya), while another eight have membership in the SADC (i.e. 
DRC
7
, Seychelles, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). Therefore, 
there are only seven COMESA countries that are not members of either the EAC or the SADC 
region, including Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, and Sudan. Five of the seven 
non-EAC and non-SADC members of the COMESA region (Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia 
and Sudan) have joined the ESA-EPA negotiation group, whose other member countries – Malawi, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles – belong to both the SADC and 
COMESA regions. The remaining countries of the COMESA region (Egypt and Libya) are not 
affiliated with either EAC or SADC, nor do they participate in any EPA negotiations
8
. 
The cross-cutting memberships in the three regions by the 26 countries suggest that the COMESA-
EAC-SADC tripartite initiative is a logical step towards wider economic integrations in the African 
continent, as this would consolidate the existing regional integration initiatives already in place. It 
would further provide the platform for creating a continent-wide free trade area as the tripartite 
region already covers more than half of the economic activities on the continent. Indeed, in the 
recent Communique of the Second COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit, it is stated that “the 
establishment of a Tripartite Free Trade Area will bolster intra-regional trade by creating a wider 
market, increase investment flows, enhance competitiveness and develop cross-regional 
infrastructure”9.  
The process towards achieving this goal will likely be quite challenging, not only with regard to 
harmonizing the uneven integration processes and cross-cutting memberships in the three regions, 
but also with respect to potential issues arising from the different EPA negotiation processes these 
regions are currently undertaking with the EU. The three regions are at different stages of regional 
integration. The EAC region has implemented a custom union and is working towards forming a 
common market and creating a monetary union. The COMESA and SADC regions are functional 
FTAs but within the SADC region there exists a long standing custom union (i.e. SACU). Clearly, a 
wider tripartite FTA would have to manage the removal of intra-Tripartite tariffs and the need to 
preserve the existing deeper integration processes. This will likely create some technical challenges 
and the phenomenon of cross-cutting memberships in existing regional blocs will only add further 
complexities to these challenges.  
                                                          
7
 However, DRC joined the CEMAC group for the EPA negotiations. 
8
 Egypt signed a EUROMED Association Agreement with the US in 2001, which entered into force in June 2004. 
Negotiations between Libya and the EU on a Framework Agreement have started in November 2008.  
9
The Communique is available from 
http://www.trademarksa.org/sites/default/files/publications/Communique%20of%20the%202nd%20Tripartite%20Su
mmit%20-%20English%20-%2012.06.2011_1.pdf 
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The various trade cooperation/negotiations these countries have had with the EU likely have exerted 
further stress to the tripartite process. In fact, the 26 member countries participating in the tripartite 
process are members of several different negotiation/signatory parties of various EU initiatives, 
ranging from the bilateral agreements for several individual countries (Egypt, Libya, and South 
Africa) to the region-to-region EPA negotiations involving the EAC-EPA group, the SADC-EPA 
group, the ESA-EPA group, and the CEMAC-EPA group. While these EPA negotiations follow the 
same basic format, the outcomes from concluded interim agreements vary from one EPA group to 
another and even from one member to another within the same EPA group in terms of liberalization 
schedules and exclusion baskets. In the absence of harmonization across the agreements for 
different EPA groups and countries, it is possible that the EPA agreements may create further 
obstacles for the tripartite process, as individual EPA agreements may contain elements that either 
prevent the tripartite countries to modify their external trade policies for purposes of creating the 
tripartite FTA or complicate the design and implementation of the tripartite FTA. In addition, the 
individual blocs with the larger tripartite region will still have to deal with the complications 
brought about by the individual EPA negotiations, as discussed earlier in this section. 
7.3 Summary 
The EPA negotiations have added further complexities to the already difficult process of achieving 
regional integration within the EAC and SADC. Not surprisingly, the level of complexity increases 
when considering the Tripartite. Some aspects of EPAs may magnify the existing difficulties while 
others may increase the value of the EAC Customs Union and SADC’s FTA. On the downside, 
there are imperfect matches between EPA negotiation groupings and the EAC and SADC and even 
within the same grouping different liberalization schedules and lists of excluded products may exist. 
The lack of coherence between the EPA negotiation groupings may create difficulties for agreeing 
and maintaining common external tariffs and developing aspects of deeper integration. Furthermore, 
the standstill clause may limit the EAC’s and SADC’s ability to negotiate preferential trade with 
other countries. On the upside, the EAC and SADC could use EPAs to signal credibility of their 
regional liberalization processes as tariff cuts and other policy reform would then be part of a 
greater package of policy changes including relationships with the EU. Simultaneously, the EAC 
and SADC could use EPAs as an entry point to include areas of deep integration like government 
procurement and investment which their regional integration efforts have not included so far. 
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8 Conclusions and policy recommendations 
8.1 Conclusions 
This report presents and discusses the recent literature and the empirical data on regional integration 
in the EAC and SADC. We have looked at the current situation on the ground: how far the EAC and 
SADC have gone in implementing their very ambitious plans for economic integration – starting 
with cutting tariffs and going even beyond monetary union – and with whom the two regional blocs 
are trading today and with whom they will likely trade tomorrow. The report emphasized the recent 
literature on EAC and SADC NTBs. Many see NTBs as the biggest stumbling block to further 
integration and we present and assess the available evidence of these measures. Importantly, we 
have also looked at how the process of regional economic integration interacts with EPAs, the 
‘elephant in the room’ when discussing regional integration in Africa. 
We find that the implementation of tariff reductions have been an impressive success. While 
especially SADC experienced some difficulties of sticking to reduction schedules initially and while 
other regional economic communities outside Africa have gone further than the EAC and SADC, 
from a historical point of view the reduction of tariffs in the two regions to near zero for nearly all 
merchandise trade is unprecedented in Africa and would have been unimaginable just a couple of 
decades ago. The EAC has by now implemented a Customs Union operating nearly without internal 
tariffs and with a CET that lowered external tariffs for most Partner States. SADC has implemented 
an FTA with more exceptions and time limited derogations than the EAC Customs Union, yet the 
FTA reduces average internal tariffs to near zero. The big question in SADC is whether traders are 
capable of taking advantage of the tariff reduction. The rules of origin necessary to operate an FTA 
are heavily criticized for being too cumbersome and most traders likely prefer alternate trading 
schemes in the form of COMESA and SACU if they are eligible. 
Unfortunately, this policy success has so far not translated into a commercial success for the Eastern 
and Southern African traders. We analyze trade data for 2000 to 2010 to detect recent changes in 
trade flows and find that the EAC countries trade a bit more with each other by 2010 than they did a 
decade earlier while the SADC FTA has not affected internal SADC trade flows significantly. But 
other important changes in the trading picture of the two regions have taken place over the last 
decade. China is rising rapidly as a major new export market and as a source of the EAC’s and 
SADC’s imports. The EU is losing ground as both an exporter and an importer. In the EAC, the 
share of exports to China increased from 0.2% to 6.4% of total exports, while the share of exports to 
the EU was nearly halved. The pattern was the same on the import side. Interestingly, the BRICs as 
a group surpassed the EU as the EAC’s biggest source of imports. In SADC, the share of exports to 
China increased from 1.2% to 11.0% while the share of EU-bound exports fell from 38.1% to 
27.1%. On the import side, China grew four times more important as a source for imports over the 
period measured by the share of imports. The EU’s share of total imports fell from roughly a third 
to a quarter. Despite the rapid rise of China, followed by other emerging economics, the EU 
remains the most important trading partner of the EAC and SADC, but this may change within the 
next decade if the current trend continues. 
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The interaction between the development of economic integration in the EAC and SADC and the 
negotiations of EPAs with the EU is worrying. Observers argue that the EAC and SADC would 
benefit from tying their commitments to reduce tariffs and other barriers to a larger agreement. The 
argument is that non-compliance with EAC and SADC commitments would become politically 
more costly when such non-compliance would also breach an EPA with the larger partner, the EU. 
Yet, while such opportunities to derive real benefits from EPAs exist, the EPAs also complicate the 
already difficult challenge of developing the cooperation in the EAC and SADC and later in the 
form of the Tripartite. 
The bicycle theory of trade recommends that NTBs are taken very seriously. Available literature 
and on-going policy work clearly demonstrate that NTBs are taken seriously by EAC and SADC 
policy-makers and remains a serious issue for traders. But despite acknowledged importance of the 
issue, the success of establishing the EAC Customs Union and the SADC FTA and removing tariffs 
has not been accompanied by the successful removal of many NTBs. Available surveys and 
reporting mechanisms reveal that NTBs continue to be plentiful.  
The information generated by surveys, reporting mechanism and other sources also demonstrate a 
surprising lack of knowledge about EAC and SADC NTBs. Multilateral institutions, governments, 
donor projects and academics have written on NTBs in the EAC and SADC recently, yet we don’t 
know whether NTBs are getting more or less severe, what their impacts are on specific industries or 
in aggregate, or how to prioritize which ones to remove first. The available evidence mainly 
documents that NTBs exist in many disguises and provide good reasons to believe they will 
proliferate now when tariffs have been removed.  
8.2 Policy recommendations 
Often policy makers do not know how to replace existing NTBs with better policy measures that are 
less restrictive to trade. Kirk (2010) argues that governments struggle with designing less trade 
restrictive measures when legitimate objectives are involved. Many NTBs origin from policy 
measures that address legitimate objectives. Some examples are food safety measures, technical 
standards, immigration regulation and customs administration. These policy measures may be 
misused to disturb trade deliberately or simply poorly used due to lack of experience of dealing with 
them thereby accidentiallybecoming NTBs. Jensen and Keyser (2010) demonstrates that this issue 
is real – they argue that recently harmonized EAC dairy standards are more likely to harm trade 
than protect the legitimate objective of food safety for which they were created. 
The approach currently used by the EAC and SADC to remove NTBs is an identification approach. 
In this approach, reporting mechanisms identify NTBs and forward the information generated to 
national administrations who are then supposed to reform them. While this approach increases 
transparency, it does not address the problems faced by national administrations in designing less 
trade restrictive measures. Yet, the identification approach has intuitive appeal: it promises to find 
the biggest NTBs and get rid of them first following the underlying logic that reducing the biggest 
obstacles will yield the largest returns. However, deep analytical difficulties complicate the 
identification and measurement of NTBs. NTBs is a residual category consisting of a broad array of 
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measures sharing only one key characteristic; that they impact trade. Comparing very different 
measures is notoriously difficult and requires deep and technical knowledge often beyond officials 
of the EAC and SADC Secretariat and of the national administrations. Consider, for example, two 
NTBs, one is a maximum limit of bacterial count in dairy products and another is time delays due to 
lengthy customs procedures. Both NTBs may be costly but the exact determination of the costliest 
NTBs require technical knowledge about dairy technology, knowledge about acceptable food safety 
protection levels, and knowledge about feasible custom reform alternatives.  
The identification approach, typified by NTB reporting mechanisms, suffers from two weaknesses 
both linked to analytical difficulties. First, Monitoring Mechanisms and the NTB reporting firms 
lack analytical capacity. Many complaints are too vague to address. Often firms simply report the 
products experiencing problems due to some unspecified technical trade barrier. Neither the firm 
nor the Monitoring Mechanism has the analytical capacity to identify the binding constraint. The 
system is therefore vulnerable to subjective complaints and biased responses. Second, the demand 
for analytical capacities is heightened from the global trend to introduce complex regulation 
essentially targeting domestic issues yet with large trade implications. Food safety laws are such an 
example. Firms may perceive legitimate measures like food safety regulations as NTBs because the 
regulations constrain their market access, but the firms fail to see that the regulations serve a 
legitimate purpose of consumer protection. Similarly, responsible agencies may argue for the 
maintenance of existing NTBs using otherwise legitimate arguments such as food safety regulation 
as an excuse. In either case, the Monitoring Mechanism is poorly equipped to assess a dispute. 
Therefore, the Monitoring Mechanism is limited to simply reiterating the statements of both firms 
and authorities involved. The NTB reporting mechanisms of the EAC and SADC serve the highly 
useful purpose of increasing transparency could be supplemented by an alternative approach: the 
issue-based approach. 
The issue-based approach addresses the problem of designing less trade restrictive measures. This 
approach develops models of regulating selected issues where legitimate objectives and trade 
concerns are known to collide and result in NTBs. It focuses on developing knowledge and 
collecting best practice in key issues universally agreed to be subject to important NTBs. Customs 
modernization is an example of a successful application of the issue-focused approach. Previously, 
custom management was focused on maximizing revenue collection, but modern custom 
administration has introduced the minimization of transaction time as an equally important 
objective of customs management. Targeted work developing new and more efficient modes of 
customs management developed by international agencies like the World Bank and the dedicated 
organization for customs, the World Customs Organization, has successfully reduced transaction 
time in many developing countries. This success has been greatly influenced by the development of 
better models of customs management and the collection of best practices at the project level by the 
international agencies and organizations (McLinden et al. 2010). 
The issue-focused approach brings together technical knowledge, policy practitioners and policy 
analysis. Technical people with long experiences and deep insight into the issue under study are 
coupled with analytical capacity to investigate the wider implications of policy initiatives. In the 
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case of customs reform, in-country policy practitioners work with international agencies with the 
capacity to collect cross-country experiences and analyze these with a view to extracting 
international best practice. 
Other trade agencies lack behind customs. The WTO SPS Agreement and the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), for example, encourage the use of trade facilitation 
instruments to reduce NTBs, namely harmonisation with international standards, mutual recognition 
and equivalence. However, neither the responsible international agencies nor developing country 
trade agencies have developed successful models of how to apply these trade facilitation 
instruments in developing countries. 
Increased demand for regulation produces new sources for NTBs in developing countries. Such 
issues include food safety, plant health, animal health, quality and safety issues expressed through 
technical standards, and immigration. The regulation of these issues presents large problems for 
trade analysts as regulations may serve both legitimate protection purposes and illegitimate 
purposes of protectionism. Using the identification approach to reduce NTBs resulting from the 
regulation of such issues suffer from high demands for specialized technical knowledge and the lack 
of commonly acknowledged models of how to create regulatory systems that meet legitimate 
regulatory objectives in a less trade restrictive manner. 
International agencies, organizations and donors could develop an issue-focused approach to 
reducing NTBs for such issues. These actors have the capacity and the experience across many 
developing countries to work with developing country governments and firms to enhance the 
understanding of trade facilitation aspects of emerging regulatory issues and collect best practice 
experiences of what works and what does not. 
To operationalise the issue-focused approach, donors, international agencies and developing 
country governments should develop: 
 An applied research program on regulation and trade facilitation in developing countries 
within areas agreed to give rise to NTBs focused on collecting best practice lessons; 
 Establish a global task force of representatives of governments, international organizations 
and the private sector involved in trade-related management in the areas under scrutiny. The 
task force should use the inputs from the research program to develop regulatory models 
appropriate for developing countries; 
 Implement pilot projects to test emerging recommendations and regulatory models. 
 
 
 
  
57 
 
References 
Anderson, J. E. and van Wincoop, E. (2004): Trade Costs. Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 
XLII (September 2004), pp. 691-751. 
Baldwin, R. (1970): Non-Tariff Distortions in International Trade. Brookings Institution, 
Washington DC. 
Beghin, J. C. and Bureau, J. C. (2001): Quantification of Sanitary, Phytosanitary and Technical 
Barriers to Trade for Trade Policy Analysis. Center for Agricultural and Rural Development 
Working Paper WP291. 
Bilal, S. and  Braun-Munzinger, C. (2008): EPA negotiations and regional integration in Africa: 
Building or stumbling blocs, Paper prepared for the Trade Policy Centre in Africa (trapca) 3rd 
Annual Conference “Strengthening and deepening economic integration in LDCs: current situation, 
challenges and way forward” ( 13-15 November, Arusha, Tanzania)  
Bilal, S., Ramdoo, I. and  De Roquefeuil, Q. (2011): Europe, G20, and South-South Trade: Insights 
from European Approaches to Regional Integration in Africa, Economic Policy Paper Series, The 
German Marshall Fund of the United States.  
Brenton, P. and Isik, G. (2012): De-fragmenting Africa – Deepening Regional Trade Integration in 
Goods and Services. World Bank. 
Brenton, P., N. Dihel, L. Hinkle, and N. Strychacz (2010): Africa’s Trade in Services and the 
Opportunities and Risks of Economic Partnership Agreements.  Africa Trade Policy Notes, Note #6 
(available from 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRREGTOPTRADE/Resources/EPAPolicyNoteREVISED
.pdf). 
Bösl, A; du Pisani, A; Erasmus, G; Hartzenberg, T; and Sandrey, R (2011): Monitoring the process 
of regional integration in Southern Africa in 2010. Introduction to Tralac: Monitoring Integration in 
Southern Africa – 2010 Yearbook. Stellenbosch, South Africa: Trade Law Centre for Southern 
Africa (Tralac). 
Cadot, O., Malouche, M. And Saez, S. (2011): Streamlining Non-Tariff Measures: A Toolkit for 
Policymakers. Washington DC: World Bank 
Carrère, C. and de Melo, J. (2009a): Non-Tariff Measures: what do we know, what should be done? 
Document de travail de la série Etudes et Documents E 2009.33. Centre d’études et de recherches 
sur le développement international (CERDI). 
Carrère, C. and de Melo, J. (2009b): Notes on detecting the effects of Non-Tariff Measures. 
Document de travail de la série Etudes et Documents E 2009.32. Centre d’études et de recherches 
sur le développement international (CERDI). 
58 
 
Charalambides (2010): Addressing NTBs in regional goods trade among Southern African 
Countries. World Bank. 
Dawar, K. and Evenett, S.J. (2008): The CARIFORUM-EC EPA: An Analysis of its Government 
Procurement and Competition Law-Related Provisions. (available from http://www.acp-eu-
trade.org/library/files/Dawar-Evenett_EN_180608_GTZ_The-CARIFORUM-EC-EPA-An-
analysis-of-its-government-procurement-and-competition.pdf). 
Dinka, T. and Kennes, W. (2007), 'Africa’s Regional Integration Arrangements: History and Challenges', 
European Centre for Development Policy Management Discussion Paper No. 74 (available from 
http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/library/files/s-Regional-Integration-Arrangements.pdf). 
EABC (2011): Business Climate Index 2011. East African Business Council.  
EABC (2008): Business Climate Index 2008. East African Business Council.  
EABC (2006): Business Climate Index 2005-06. East African Business Council.  
EABC (2004): Business Climate Survey. East African Business Council. 
EAC Secretariat (2012): Status of Elimination of Non Tariff Barriers in the East African 
Community – Volume 2 (March 2012). Arusha: East African Community Secretariat. 
EAC Secretariat (2011): Status of Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers (August 2011). Arusha: East 
African Community Secretariat. 
EAC Secretariat (2009): EAC time-bound programme for elimination of identified Non-Tariff 
Barriers (NTBs). Arusha: East African Community Secretariat. 
European Centre for Development Policy Management (2010): African Regional and Sub Regional 
Economic Integration Groupings and the Regional Economic Partnerships Agreement (EPA) Negotiations 
Configurations.  
European Commission (2010a): Agreement establishing a framework for an economic partnership 
agreement between the European Community and its member states, on the one part, and the East African 
Community partner states, on the other part (available from 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/february/tradoc_145792.pdf). 
 
European Commission (2010b): Interim agreement establishing a framework for an economic partnership 
agreement between the Eastern and Southern Africa States, on the one part, and the European Community 
and its member states, on the one part (available from 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/november/tradoc_147042.pdf). 
European Commission (2009): Interim agreement with a view to an economic partnership agreement 
between the European Community and its member states, of the one part, and the SADC EPA states, of the 
other part (available from http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/july/tradoc_143981.pdf). 
European Parliament (2011): Economic Partnership Agreements EU-ACP: Facts and Key Issues. 
Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy (OPPD)  in cooperation with the Policy 
59 
 
Department of DG EXPO (available from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/oppd/Page_1/EPAFacts&KeyIssuesFinal-EN.pdf). 
Evenett, S. (2003): Is there a case for new multilateral rules on transparency in government 
procurement. In Evenett, S. and the Swiss State Secretariat of Economic Affairs: The Singapore 
Issues and the World Trading System: the Road to Cancun and Beyond.  
Flatters, (2010): Implementing the SADC FTA: Where Are We? What Next? Southern Africa 
Global Competitiveness Hub Technical Report. Gaborone, Botswana. 
Imani Development (2007): Inventory of Regional Non Tariff Barriers: Synthesis Report. Report 
prepared for the Regional Trade Facilitation Programme. Lynnwood Ridge, South Africa: Imani 
Development. 
Jensen, M. F. (2011): Developing the SADC Approach to SPS Issues. Technical Report prepared 
for the Southern African Trade Hub. August 2011. Gaborone: Botswana: Southern African Trade 
Hub. 
Jensen, M. F. and Keyser, J. C. (2010): Non-Tariff Measures on Goods Trade in the East African 
Community – Assessment of Regional Dairy Trade. Washington DC: World Bank. 
Keane, J., Calì, M., and Kennan, J. (2010): Impedients to Intra-Regional Trade in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Report prepared for the Commonwealth Secretariat. September 2010. Overseas 
Development Institute. 
Kemp, M. C. and Wan, H. Jr. (1976): An Elementary Proposition Concerning the Formation of 
Customs Unions. Journal of International Economics 6, (February), pp. 95-97 
Kirk, R. (2010): Addressing Trade Restrictive Non Tariff Measures on Goods Trade in the East 
African Community. Africa Trade Policy Notes #7. August 2010. The World Bank. 
Khumalo, N. (2009): Analysis of the Economic Partnership Agreement Process: Trade in Services 
Negotiations in the SADC-EU EPA. Part 1 in Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) (2009),' How to Ensure Development Friendly Economic Partnership 
Agreements -Lessons Across Regions'. 
Krugman, Paul R., (1979): Increasing Returns, Monopolistic Competition and International Trade, 
Journal of International Economics, 9, 469-479. 
 
Lui, D. and Bilal, S. (2009): Contentious issues in the interim EPAs: Potential Flexibility in the 
negotiations. European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) Discussion Paper 
No. 89. 
Mangeni, F. (2009): Analysis of the Economic Partnership Agreement Process: Investment 
Negotiations in the EAC-EU EPA. Part 2 in Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit 
(GTZ) (2009):' How to Ensure Development Friendly Economic Partnership Agreements -Lessons 
Across Regions. 
60 
 
McLinden, G, Fanta, E, Widdowson, D., and Doyle, T. (2010): Border Management Modernization: 
A Practical Guide for Reformers. Washington DC: The World Bank. 
Mugisa, E., Onyango, C. and Mugoya, P. (2009): An Evaluation of the Implementation and Impact 
of the East African Community Customs Union. Final Report, March 2009. Arusha. EAC 
Secretariat. 
Panagariya, A. and Krishna, P. (2002): On necessarily welfare-enhancing free trade areas. Journal 
of International Economics Vol. 57(2), pages 353-367, August. 
Peters, C. (2011): Is SADC Loosing Track? Chapter 8 in Tralac: Monitoring Integration in Southern 
Africa – 2010 Yearbook. Stellenbosch, South Africa: Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa 
(Tralac). 
Portugal-Perez, A. and Wilson, J. S. (2008): Trade Costs in Africa: Barriers and Opportunities for 
Reform. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper #4619. 
RATES (2004): Regional Dairy Trade Policy Paper. Regional Agricultural Trade Expansion 
Support Program (RATES), Nairobi. 
SATH (2011): 2011 Audit of the Implementation of the SADC Protocol on Trade. August 2011. 
Gaborone: Southern Africa Trade Hub (SATH). 
SATH (2010): 2010 Audit of the Implementation of the SADC Protocol on Trade. June 2010. 
Gaborone: Southern Africa Trade Hub (SATH). 
SATH (2007): Audit of the Implementation of the SADC Protocol on Trade. August 2007. 
Gaborone: Southern Africa Trade Hub (SATH). 
Sauvé, P. & Ward, N. (2009), 'The EC-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement: Assessing 
the Outcome on Services and Investment'  European Centre for International Political Economy 
(ECIPE) (available from http://www.ecipe.org/publications/ecipe-working-papers/the-ec-cariform-
economic-partnership-agreement-assessing-the-outcome-on-services-and-investment/PDF). 
Stahl, H.-M. (2005): Tariff Liberalisation Impact of the EAC Customs Union in Perspective. tralac 
Working Paper No 4, August 2005. 
South Centre (2010): EPA Contentious Issues Matrix: State of the Play, Key Problems and 
Recommendations. Analytical Note SC/TDP/AN/EPA/26. Geneva, Switzerland. 
TMSA (2011): Establishing a Regional Non-Tariff Barrier Reporting and Monitoring Mechanism. 
Aid-for-Trade Case Story. 31 January 2011. Pretoria: TradeMark Southern Africa (TMSA). 
tralac (2010): EAC Customs Union needs commitment of partner countries. Article on the website 
of tralac, posted Friday, 15 January, 2010. www.tralac.org/2010/01/15/eac-customs-union-needs-
commitment-of-partner-countries. Accessed on 14 May 2012. Stellenbosch: Trade Law Centre 
(tralac). 
61 
 
van Tongeren, Beghin, and Marette (2009): A Cost-Benefit Framework for the Assessment of Non-
Tariff Measures in Agro-Food Trade. OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Working Papers No. 
21. 
Viljoen, W. (2011): Non-Tariff Barriers affecting trade in the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite 
Free Trade Agreement. Stellenbosch: tralac. 
Viner, J. (1950): The Customs Union Issue. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace. 
Walker, A. (2011): The EC-SADC EPA: The Moment of Truth for Regional Integration, Trade 
Negotiations Insights, 8(6) (available from http://ictsd.org/downloads/tni/tni_en_8-6.pdf). 
Westcott, T.J.  (2009): Investment Provisions and Commitments in the CARIFORUM-EU 
Economic Partnership Agreement and in Interim EPAs between other ACP Regions and the EU. 
Part 2 in Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) (2009): How to Ensure 
Development Friendly Economic Partnership Agreements -Lessons Across Regions. 
Woolcock, S. (2008): Public Procurement and the Economic Partnership Agreements: assessing the 
potential impact on ACP procurement policies. Commonwealth Secretariat (available from 
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/GFSR.asp?NodeID=179104). 
World Bank (2012b): Africa Can Help Feed Africa: Removing barriers to regional trade in food 
staples. Poverty Reduction and Economic Management, Africa Region, World Bank. 
World Bank (2011): Harnessing Regional Integration for Trade and Growth in Southern Africa. 
PREM 1, Africa Region, the World Bank. 
World Bank (2008): Non-Tariff Measures on Goods Trade in the East African Community: 
Synthesis Report. October 10, 2008 (Report No. 45708-AFR). World Bank. 
World Bank (2005): Tanzania’s Agro-Food Trade and Emerging Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
Standards: Towards a Strategic Approach and Action Plan. Background study for the Tanzania 
Diagnostic Trade Integration Study. World Bank. 
  
62 
 
Appendix A: Data 
 
Table 1a. EAC’s export and imports to/from major trading partners (US$1,000) 
Year EAC China OBRIC EU USA North 
Africa 
South 
Africa 
Other 
SSA 
World 
Exports 
2000 500,519 5,021 122,511 1,016,604 60,066 100,321 48,372 179,611 2,672,472 
2001 476,277 4,173 114,452 1,152,790 65,298 107,231 43,963 207,159 2,962,415 
2002 631,620 5,162 106,172 1,074,517 44,082 40,990 69,066 260,007 2,849,783 
2003 975,052 12,896 126,967 1,537,935 65,918 91,146 84,577 369,395 4,331,857 
2004 1,187,956 87,195 178,606 1,635,546 79,666 99,486 154,204 407,830 4,992,128 
2005 1,333,910 123,617 157,406 1,617,421 265,742 142,995 334,871 735,651 6,167,336 
2006 1,157,922 180,422 146,033 1,667,114 333,273 161,941 319,259 919,668 6,697,797 
2007 1,557,888 193,986 219,907 1,915,901 378,263 194,161 256,800 1,205,056 7,895,788 
2008 2,016,693 320,603 362,738 2,405,991 378,029 249,294 345,442 1,699,494 10,238,277 
2009 1,980,310 444,643 336,465 2,081,704 316,348 186,522 262,851 1,410,525 9,387,054 
2010 2,362,808 728,449 415,835 2,241,250 362,898 249,521 478,337 1,712,234 11,351,623 
Imports 
2000 451,008 200,944 337,559 1,507,570 217,326 29,517 445,099 89,231 5,581,942 
2001 467,363 214,689 392,383 1,833,521 640,167 56,774 543,344 157,068 7,159,585 
2002 513,319 213,466 397,683 1,722,970 349,010 48,140 521,080 133,113 6,221,239 
2003 626,628 286,126 541,904 1,548,073 400,140 81,948 690,041 139,729 7,420,769 
2004 711,805 459,360 687,878 2,097,962 398,394 123,137 938,664 170,256 9,322,987 
2005 948,028 665,051 818,040 2,441,481 765,736 130,013 1,138,85
9 
214,579 11,817,028 
2006 930,195 898,154 1,210,084 3,151,079 583,930 210,358 1,222,95
5 
336,751 15,238,512 
2007 1,098,439 1,435,105 2,055,094 3,833,646 985,394 282,573 1,362,88
3 
312,125 19,503,762 
2008 1,584,276 2,141,926 3,075,994 4,547,013 783,823 315,763 1,862,09
3 
436,683 25,092,212 
2009 1,430,288 2,160,737 2,784,209 4,276,954 929,748 224,071 1,886,89
0 
331,154 22,437,006 
2010 1,300,828 2,913,806 3,361,631 4,357,056 769,861 375,322 1,789,96
0 
443,135 25,602,681 
Source: compilations based on the COMTRADE database of the UN. 
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Table 1b. Shares of EAC’s export and imports to/from major trading partners (%) 
Year EAC China OBRIC EU USA North 
Africa 
South 
Africa 
Other 
SSA 
World 
Exports 
2000 18.7 0.2 4.6 38.0 2.2 3.8 1.8 6.7 100.0 
2001 16.1 0.1 3.9 38.9 2.2 3.6 1.5 7.0 100.0 
2002 22.2 0.2 3.7 37.7 1.5 1.4 2.4 9.1 100.0 
2003 22.5 0.3 2.9 35.5 1.5 2.1 2.0 8.5 100.0 
2004 23.8 1.7 3.6 32.8 1.6 2.0 3.1 8.2 100.0 
2005 21.6 2.0 2.6 26.2 4.3 2.3 5.4 11.9 100.0 
2006 17.3 2.7 2.2 24.9 5.0 2.4 4.8 13.7 100.0 
2007 19.7 2.5 2.8 24.3 4.8 2.5 3.3 15.3 100.0 
2008 19.7 3.1 3.5 23.5 3.7 2.4 3.4 16.6 100.0 
2009 21.1 4.7 3.6 22.2 3.4 2.0 2.8 15.0 100.0 
2010 20.8 6.4 3.7 19.7 3.2 2.2 4.2 15.1 100.0 
Imports 
2000 8.1 3.6 6.0 27.0 3.9 0.5 8.0 1.6 100.0 
2001 6.5 3.0 5.5 25.6 8.9 0.8 7.6 2.2 100.0 
2002 8.3 3.4 6.4 27.7 5.6 0.8 8.4 2.1 100.0 
2003 8.4 3.9 7.3 20.9 5.4 1.1 9.3 1.9 100.0 
2004 7.6 4.9 7.4 22.5 4.3 1.3 10.1 1.8 100.0 
2005 8.0 5.6 6.9 20.7 6.5 1.1 9.6 1.8 100.0 
2006 6.1 5.9 7.9 20.7 3.8 1.4 8.0 2.2 100.0 
2007 5.6 7.4 10.5 19.7 5.1 1.4 7.0 1.6 100.0 
2008 6.3 8.5 12.3 18.1 3.1 1.3 7.4 1.7 100.0 
2009 6.4 9.6 12.4 19.1 4.1 1.0 8.4 1.5 100.0 
2010 5.1 11.4 13.1 17.0 3.0 1.5 7.0 1.7 100.0 
Source: compilations based on the COMTRADE database of the UN. 
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Table 2. Shares of Top 5 HS6 export products for selected EAC countries in 2000 and 2010 (%) 
CommodityCode 2000 CommodityCode 2010 
Burundi 
Raw sugar, cane 51.0 Tea, black (fermented or partly) in packages > 
3 kg 
44.6 
Coffee, not roasted, not decaffeinated 34.6 Bovine skins, whole, raw 10.9 
Tea, black (fermented or partly) in 
packages > 3 kg 
8.9 Waste or scrap, of alloy steel, other than 
stainless 
7.6 
Cigarettes containing tobacco 1.9 Cigarettes containing tobacco 5.2 
Automobiles, spark ignition engine of 1500-
3000 cc 
1.2 Soaps, for toilet use, solid 4.6 
Cum. Share 97.6  73.0 
Kenya 
Portland cement, other than white cement 9.7 Medicaments nes, in dosage 8.0 
Petroleum spirit except aviation or motor 
fuel 
9.6 Palm oil or fractions simply refined 6.2 
Kerosene jet fuel 3.3 Oils petroleum, bituminous, distillates, except 
crude 
3.5 
Gas oils - bunker oil, No.1 furnace, motor 
diesel 
3.1 Salt (sodium chloride) including solution, salt 
water 
2.9 
Sacks & bags (including cones) of polymers 
of ethylen 
2.5 Portland cement, other than white cement 2.1 
Cum. Share 28.2  22.7 
Tanzania 
Tea, black (fermented or partly) in 
packages > 3 kg 
31.7 Ammonium sulphate-nitrate mix, double salts, 
pack>10k 
10.5 
Parts of electrical transformers and 
inductors 
4.8 Textile furnishing articles nes, knit or crochet 6.8 
Cotton, carded or combed 3.9 Diammonium phosphate, in packs >10 kg 6.5 
Wheat or meslin flour 3.8 Natural gas, liquefied 3.4 
Glass containers nes for packing or 
conveyance goods 
3.8 Tea, black (fermented or partly) in packages > 
3 kg 
3.3 
Cum. Share 48.1  30.4 
Uganda 
Electrical energy 27.8 Tobacco, unmanufactured, stemmed or 
stripped 
9.5 
Cotton-seed or fractions simply refined 23.5 Portland cement, other than white cement 8.5 
Tea, black (fermented or partly) in 
packages > 3 kg 
18.3 Tea, black (fermented or partly) in packages < 
3 kg 
6.4 
Tea, black (fermented or partly) in packages 
< 3 kg 
1.9 Tea, black (fermented or partly) in packages > 
3 kg 
4.9 
Beans dried, shelled, nes 1.6 Veg fats, oils or fractions hydrogenated, 
esterified 
4.0 
Cum. Share 73.2  33.3 
Source: compilations based on the COMTRADE database of the UN. 
65 
 
 
 
Table 3. Service exports from EAC countries (million US$) 
  Burundi Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda 
2000 4.0   40.6 627.4 208.0 
2001 5.2   48.2 915.4 217.0 
2002 7.5   46.1 920.1 225.0 
2003 7.3   76.5 947.8 262.0 
2004 17.4   102.7 1,133.6 373.0 
2005 37.6 1,879.1 119.7 1,269.2 525.0 
2006 35.5 2,428.6 201.7 1,528.1 526.0 
2007 33.3 2,931.2 240.6 1,875.7 594.6 
2008 98.8 3,260.2 408.2 1,998.8 802.4 
2009 61.4 2,885.4 341.1 1,854.6 966.3 
2010   3,671.3 310.4   1,210.7 
Source: UN Service database. 
 
Table 4. EAC’s inward FDI flows (million US$) 
 Burundi Kenya Rwanda Uganda Tanzania EAC 
2000           11.7          110.9              8.1          180.8          282.0          593.5  
2001            -0.0              5.3            18.5          151.5          467.2          642.5  
2002             0.0            27.6              1.5          184.6          387.6          601.4  
2003            -0.0            81.7              2.6          202.2          308.2          594.7  
2004             0.0            46.1            10.9          295.4          330.6          683.0  
2005             0.6            21.2            14.3          379.8          494.1          910.0  
2006             0.0            50.7            30.6          644.3          597.0      1,322.6  
2007             0.5          729.1            82.3          792.3          647.0      2,251.1  
2008           13.6            95.6          103.4          728.9          679.3      1,620.7  
2009             9.9          140.5          118.7          815.9          645.0      1,730.0  
2010           14.1          133.0            42.3          847.6          700.0      1,737.0  
Source: UNCTAD FDI database.  
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Table 5a. SADC’s export and imports to major trading partners (US$1,000) 
period South 
Africa 
SADC China EU USA SACU Other  
SSA 
World 
Exports 
2000 1,717,883 5,883,520 445,653 14,639,867 3,333,034 1,825,843 890,965 38,376,159 
2001 1,707,570 5,368,831 663,053 16,106,128 4,445,140 1,748,329 1,144,951 37,790,896 
2002 1,796,845 6,259,098 562,781 15,477,107 3,391,954 1,912,602 1,647,946 36,558,786 
2003 1,849,481 6,764,133 935,557 18,141,720 5,164,011 1,904,999 1,533,697 45,648,423 
2004 3,419,948 9,278,523 1,447,926 23,173,580 6,480,019 3,535,828 1,935,933 59,525,969 
2005 3,249,059 9,839,272 1,702,160 25,759,048 5,856,905 3,404,370 2,167,473 65,638,767 
2006 3,930,562 14,516,527 2,687,758 28,263,579 6,878,452 4,368,619 2,609,645 80,777,910 
2007 5,207,404 14,593,170 4,882,889 30,718,824 8,280,240 5,579,772 3,004,656 91,530,611 
2008 4,574,123 16,022,013 5,523,794 33,764,595 9,011,946 4,879,145 3,629,690 101,745,850 
2009 2,959,563 11,996,675 6,838,823 20,769,762 5,400,026 3,125,143 3,273,489 73,079,738 
2010 4,071,012 14,980,909 10,700,848 26,246,352 7,529,629 4,203,723 3,822,840 96,868,538 
Imports 
2000 
5,976,505 6,773,583 1,415,294 12,849,737 3,502,255 6,044,428 378,858 39,572,649 
2001 
6,651,358 7,698,162 1,485,529 12,854,634 3,538,358 6,768,219 531,027 40,044,061 
2002 
8,489,429 9,648,364 1,847,579 13,869,629 3,546,369 8,645,588 670,011 43,456,054 
2003 
9,006,593 10,309,610 2,931,847 17,722,204 3,792,544 9,089,195 717,254 52,904,367 
2004 
11,313,132 13,423,912 4,580,008 22,800,790 4,606,376 11,540,476 1,227,604 71,226,175 
2005 
9,791,543 13,796,338 6,098,931 25,241,024 4,816,009 10,463,363 1,184,491 79,338,325 
2006 
11,308,144 14,848,939 8,280,714 28,275,259 6,004,864 12,100,361 2,297,991 95,978,003 
2007 
13,374,117 19,258,493 10,723,210 32,503,266 6,980,681 14,351,807 2,219,995 114,156,376 
2008 
15,854,850 23,135,625 12,897,751 34,274,177 8,144,189 16,617,201 2,858,380 130,292,648 
2009 
10,419,879 15,115,324 10,595,894 25,822,003 5,895,401 10,948,160 2,741,005 95,014,642 
2010 
13,982,703 20,802,067 14,723,226 31,897,816 7,303,363 14,749,327 3,061,754 120,866,653 
Source: compilations based on the COMTRADE database of the UN. 
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Table 5b. Shares of SADC’s export and imports to major trading partners (%) 
 South 
Africa 
SADC China OBRIC EU USA NORA SACU Other 
SSA 
World 
Exports 
2000 4.5 15.3 1.2 2.1 38.1 8.7 0.3 4.8 2.3 100.0 
2001 4.5 14.2 1.8 2.2 42.6 11.8 0.7 4.6 3.0 100.0 
2002 4.9 17.1 1.5 2.0 42.3 9.3 0.6 5.2 4.5 100.0 
2003 4.1 14.8 2.0 1.7 39.7 11.3 0.4 4.2 3.4 100.0 
2004 5.7 15.6 2.4 1.9 38.9 10.9 0.3 5.9 3.3 100.0 
2005 4.9 15.0 2.6 2.7 39.2 8.9 0.5 5.2 3.3 100.0 
2006 4.9 18.0 3.3 2.0 35.0 8.5 0.8 5.4 3.2 100.0 
2007 5.7 15.9 5.3 2.5 33.6 9.0 0.8 6.1 3.3 100.0 
2008 4.5 15.7 5.4 3.5 33.2 8.9 1.0 4.8 3.6 100.0 
2009 4.0 16.4 9.4 4.2 28.4 7.4 0.9 4.3 4.5 100.0 
2010 4.2 15.5 11.0 4.6 27.1 7.8 0.7 4.3 3.9 100.0 
Imports 
2000 15.1 17.1 3.6 2.6 32.5 8.9 0.1 15.3 1.0 100.0 
2001 16.6 19.2 3.7 3.5 32.1 8.8 0.1 16.9 1.3 100.0 
2002 19.5 22.2 4.3 3.2 31.9 8.2 0.2 19.9 1.5 100.0 
2003 17.0 19.5 5.5 3.5 33.5 7.2 0.2 17.2 1.4 100.0 
2004 15.9 18.8 6.4 3.7 32.0 6.5 0.1 16.2 1.7 100.0 
2005 12.3 17.4 7.7 4.4 31.8 6.1 0.2 13.2 1.5 100.0 
2006 11.8 15.5 8.6 4.8 29.5 6.3 0.6 12.6 2.4 100.0 
2007 11.7 16.9 9.4 5.3 28.5 6.1 0.2 12.6 1.9 100.0 
2008 12.2 17.8 9.9 5.6 26.3 6.3 0.3 12.8 2.2 100.0 
2009 11.0 15.9 11.2 6.1 27.2 6.2 0.2 11.5 2.9 100.0 
2010 11.6 17.2 12.2 5.9 26.4 6.0 0.2 12.2 2.5 100.0 
Source: compilations based on the COMTRADE database of the UN. 
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Table 6. Shares of Top 5 HS6 export products for selected SADC countries in 2000 and 2010* (%) 
 CommodityCode 2000 CommodityCode 2010 
Botswana Disodium carbonate 28.3 Bovine cuts boneless, fresh or 
chilled 
8.8 
 Automobiles, spark ignition engine of 
1500-3000 cc 
7.7 Gold in unwrought forms non-
monetary 
7.8 
 Road tractors for semi-trailers (truck 
tractors) 
6.1 Bovine cuts boneless, frozen 5.1 
 Salt (sodium chloride) including solution, 
salt water 
4.7 Disodium carbonate 5.0 
 Copper mattes 2.3 Nickel mattes 4.4 
 Cum. Share 49.1  31.1 
Lesotho* Footwear uppers and parts thereof, except 
stiffeners 
27.1 Greasy wool (other than shorn) not 
carded or combed 24.9 
 Mens, boys trousers & shorts, material 
nes, not knit 
14.9 
Maize (corn) flour 16.7 
 Footwear,sole rubber/plastic,upper textile, 
not sport 
14.6 Parts, electric switches, protectors 
& connectors nes 6.7 
 Colour television 
receivers/monitors/projectors 
10.2 
Potato flour or meal 6.0 
 Ice, snow and potable water not 
sweetened or flavoure 
6.9 Colour television 
receivers/monitors/projectors 4.2 
 Cum. Share 73.7  0 
Madagascar CommodityCode 2000 CommodityCode 2010 
 Oils petroleum, bituminous, distillates, 
except crude 
12.5 Oils petroleum, bituminous, 
distillates, except crude 
11.5 
 Shrimps and prawns, frozen 11.7 Mens, boys shirts, of cotton, not 
knit 
7.4 
 Documents of title (bonds etc), unused 
stamps etc 
5.6 Trailers, semi-trailers nes 4.1 
 Fish nes, frozen, whole 5.1 Helicopters of an unladen weight < 
2,000 kg 
4.0 
 Worn clothing and other worn articles 4.9 Commodities not specified 
according to kind 
3.8 
 Cum. Share 39.8  30.8 
Malawi CommodityCode 2000 CommodityCode 2010 
 Tea, black (fermented or partly) in 
packages > 3 kg 
14.9 Tea, black (fermented or partly) in 
packages > 3 kg 
13.9 
 Raw sugar, cane 9.7 Raw sugar, cane 13.7 
 Tobacco, unmanufactured, not stemmed 
or stripped 
8.1 Tobacco, unmanufactured, not 
stemmed or stripped 
4.5 
 Tobacco, unmanufactured, stemmed or 
stripped 
4.7 Tobacco, unmanufactured, 
stemmed or stripped 
3.8 
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 Mens, boys trousers shorts, synthetic 
fibre, not knit 
2.8 Natural rubber in other forms 3.4 
 Cum. Share 40.2  39.3 
Mauritius CommodityCode 2000 CommodityCode 2010 
 Wheat or meslin flour 15.9 Animal feed preparations nes 7.2 
 Woven cotton nes, >85% <200g/m2, 
unbleached 
12.8 Mens, boys shirts, of cotton, not 
knit 
4.5 
 Looped pile knit or crochet fabric, of 
cotton 
7.3 Looped pile knit or crochet fabric, of 
cotton 
4.4 
 Denim cotton >85% >200g/m2 4.2 Mens, boys trousers & shorts, of 
cotton, not knit 
4.0 
 Yarn of combed wool, >85% wool, not 
retail 
3.5 T-shirts, singlets and other vests, of 
cotton, knit 
3.5 
 Cum. Share 43.6  23.6 
Mozambique CommodityCode 2000 CommodityCode 2010 
 Coconut (copra) oil crude 51.5 Shrimps and prawns, frozen 47.8 
 Electrical energy 10.9 Oils petroleum, bituminous, 
distillates, except crude 
23.1 
 Coconut or copra oil-cake and other solid 
residues 
6.0 Natural gas, liquefied 5.4 
 Tobacco, unmanufactured, not stemmed 
or stripped 
3.1 Electrical energy 2.2 
 Shrimps and prawns, frozen 2.8 Documents of title (bonds etc), 
unused stamps etc 
2.1 
 Cum. Share 74.3  80.6 
Namibia* CommodityCode 2000 CommodityCode 2010 
 Beer made from malt 22.2 Zinc ores and concentrates 39.3 
 Gold, semi-manufactured forms, non-
monetary 
9.6 Documents of title (bonds etc), 
unused stamps etc 5.6 
 Documents of title (bonds etc), unused 
stamps etc 
7.3 
Beer made from malt 3.6 
 Oils petroleum, bituminous, distillates, 
except crude 
5.9 Gold, semi-manufactured forms, 
non-monetary 2.8 
 Diamonds (jewellery) unworked or simply 
sawn, cleaved 
4.2 Zinc, not alloyed, unwrought, <99% 
pure 2.4 
 Cum. Share 49.2 
 
53.6 
Seychelles* CommodityCode 2000 CommodityCode 2010 
 Fish nes, frozen, whole 78.1 Containers for 
compressed/liquefied gas, iron or 
stee 33.6 
 Mineral and aerated waters not 
sweetened or flavoured 
5.7 
Cigarettes containing tobacco 19.6 
 Flour or meal, pellet, fish, etc, for animal 
feed 
2.4 
Animal feed preparations nes 7.2 
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 Cigarettes containing tobacco 1.8 Fish oils except liver, not chemically 
modified 5.1 
 Oils petroleum, bituminous, distillates, 
except crude 
1.5 Commodities not specified 
according to kind 4.6 
 Cum. Share 89.6 
 
70.2 
SouthAfrica CommodityCode 2000 CommodityCode 2010 
 Structures and parts of structures, iron or 
steel, ne 
14.8 Oils petroleum, bituminous, 
distillates, except crude 
6.1 
 Diesel powered trucks weighing < 5 tonnes 2.0 Parts for mineral sort, screen, mix, 
etc machines 
2.1 
 Oils petroleum, bituminous, distillates, 
except crude 
1.8 Structures and parts of structures, 
iron or steel, ne 
1.9 
 Medicaments nes, in dosage 1.7 Diesel powered trucks weighing < 5 
tonnes 
1.5 
 Cigarettes containing tobacco 1.3 Electrical energy 1.1 
 Cum. Share 21.6  12.7 
Swaziland CommodityCode 2000 CommodityCode 2010 
 Chem wood pulp, soda or sulphate, 
conifer, unbleached 
18.7 Chemical industry products, 
preparations, mixtures ne 33.7 
 Food preparations nes 13.6 Chem wood pulp, soda or sulphate, 
conifer, unbleached 22.8 
 Raw sugar, cane 8.6 Benzoic acid, its salts & esters 3.0 
 Mixed odoriferous substances - food & 
drink industrie 
7.9 Mixed odoriferous substances - 
food & drink industrie 2.6 
 T-shirts, singlets etc, of material nes, knit 3.7 Printed matter, nes 2.5 
 Cum. Share 52.5 
 
64.7 
Tanzania CommodityCode 2000 CommodityCode 2010 
 Glass containers nes for packing or 
conveyance goods 
12.2 Urea, including aqueous solution in 
packs >10 kg 
53.1 
 Recorded magnetic tapes, width < 4 mm 8.1 Gold, semi-manufactured forms, 
non-monetary 
5.0 
 Gold, semi-manufactured forms, non-
monetary 
7.2 Tobacco refuse 2.6 
 Knotted netting, nets not fishing of 
manmade textiles 
6.9 Wheat or meslin flour 1.8 
 Gold in unwrought forms non-monetary 6.5 Textile furnishing articles nes, knit 
or crochet 
1.1 
 Cum. Share 40.8  63.6 
Zambia CommodityCode 2000 CommodityCode 2010 
 Cobalt, unwrought, matte, waste or scrap, 
powders 
20.7 Raw sugar, cane 10.4 
 Raw sugar, cane 11.8 Tobacco, unmanufactured, not 
stemmed or stripped 
9.3 
 Wire of refined copper > 6mm wide 9.9 Copper cathodes and sections of 
cathodes unwrought 
7.6 
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 Copper cathodes and sections of cathodes 
unwrought 
5.5 Wire of refined copper > 6mm wide 5.6 
 Cobalt, articles thereof, nes 3.8 Cobalt, articles thereof, nes 4.6 
 Cum. Share 51.6  37.4 
Zimbabwe CommodityCode 2000 CommodityCode 2010 
 Cotton, not carded or combed 6.7 Gold, semi-manufactured forms, 
non-monetary 
27.5 
 Nickel ores and concentrates 4.5 Raw sugar, cane 21.7 
 Tobacco, unmanufactured, not stemmed 
or stripped 
4.2 Nickel ores and concentrates 14.1 
 Refined sugar, in solid form, flavoured or 
coloured 
3.3 Nickel mattes 13.3 
 Tobacco, unmanufactured, stemmed or 
stripped 
3.3 Documents of title (bonds etc), 
unused stamps etc 
2.4 
 Cum. Share 22.0  79.1 
Source: compilations based on the COMTRADE database of the UN. 
*: due to data availability, not all the countries reported data for the year of 2010 to the COMTRADE 
database. Specifically in this table the ending year for Lesotho, Namibia, and Seychelles is 2008, while that 
for Swaziland is 2007;  
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Table 7. Service exports from SADC countries (million US$) 
 2000 2001 2002 2004 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Angola 267 203 207 323 1,484 311 329 623 857 
Botswana 80 174 646 612 702 656 1,138 312 284 
DRC 67 79 131 402 433 392 828 650  
Lesotho 39 34 33 66 55 72 62 77 97 
Madagascar 364 351 397 426 665 1,013 1,296 861 1,030 
Malawi 20 30 39 37 64 86 101 95  
Mauritius 1,071 1,204 1,149 1,453 1,674 2,195 2,536 2,229  
Mozambique 325 250 339 256 386 459 555 612 647 
Namibia 176 280 267 476 526 598 555 634 984 
Seychelles 287 294 313 327 430 472 473 404  
South Africa 5,061 4,883 4,972 9,833 12,207 13,774 12,770 11,938 13,984 
swaziland 274 114 165 250 283 241 225 201 269 
Tanzania 627 915 920 1,134 1,528 1,876 1,999 1,855  
Zambia 115 144 115 232 229 273 300 241 312 
Zimbabwe 291 214 184 5,033 219 175 150 167 175 
total 9,065 9,169 9,876 20,858 20,887 22,593 23,316 20,900 18,638 
Source: UN Service database. 
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Table 8. SADC’s inward FDI flows (million US$) 
 Angola Bots. DRC Madag. Mozamb. Namibia South 
Africa 
Tanz. Zamb. SADC 
2000     
2,174.4  
          
57.2  
          
72.0  
          
83.0  
        139.3          
186.5  
        
887.3  
        
282.0  
        
121.7  
    4,421.6  
2001     
3,058.9  
          
30.7  
          
80.3  
          
93.1  
        255.4          
365.2  
    
6,783.9  
        
467.2  
        
145.3  
  
11,347.4  
2002     
3,133.5  
        
403.
4  
        
141.1  
          
61.1  
        347.6          
181.4  
    
1,569.2  
        
387.6  
        
298.4  
    6,727.0  
2003     
5,685.0  
        
418.
0  
        
391.3  
          
95.5  
        336.7          
148.7  
        
733.7  
        
308.2  
        
347.0  
    8,539.7  
2004     
5,606.4  
        
391.
1  
        
409.0  
          
95.2  
        244.7          
225.8  
        
798.0  
        
330.6  
        
364.0  
    8,658.5  
2005     
6,794.2  
        
278.
6  
               
-    
          
86.0  
        107.9          
348.0  
    
6,646.9  
        
494.1  
        
356.9  
  
15,320.6  
2006     
9,063.7  
        
486.
4  
        
256.1  
        
294.5  
        153.7          
386.6  
      -
526.8  
        
597.0  
        
615.8  
  
11,605.1  
2007     
9,795.8  
        
494.
6  
    
1,808.
0  
        
773.3  
        427.4          
733.0  
    
5,694.5  
        
647.0  
    
1,323.9  
  
21,797.0  
2008   
16,581.
0  
        
528.
1  
    
1,726.
8  
    
1,169.4  
        591.6          
720.3  
    
9,006.3  
        
679.3  
        
938.6  
  
31,555.9  
2009   
11,671.
5  
        
579.
4  
        
663.8  
    
1,066.1  
        892.5          
516.4  
    
5,365.4  
        
645.0  
        
694.8  
  
21,840.1  
2010     
9,941.6  
        
529.
3  
    
2,939.
3  
        
860.4  
        788.9          
857.6  
    
1,553.0  
        
700.0  
    
1,041.4  
  
19,542.8  
Source: UNCTAD FDI database.  
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Table 9. SADC’s outward FDI flows, selected countries (million US$) 
Period   
Angola Mauritius South Africa Zambia SADC 
2000 -21.43 12.69 270.61 0.00 289.81 
2001 -37.56 2.85 -3177.89 0.00 -2844.46 
2002 28.70 8.58 -397.98 0.00 -294.74 
2003 23.60 -5.48 565.12 0.00 830.39 
2004 35.20 31.67 1350.06 0.00 1371.61 
2005 221.18 47.53 930.29 0.00 1312.41 
2006 194.15 10.12 6063.31 0.00 6334.49 
2007 911.87 58.03 2965.92 85.60 4088.08 
2008 2569.64 52.16 -3133.68 0.00 -490.74 
2009 8.33 37.45 1151.45 269.56 1450.83 
2010 1163.28 128.70 450.33 288.70 2026.91 
Source: UNCTAD FDI database.
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Table 10. Overview of EPA negotiations status and regional groupings in SADC 
LDC 
designation 
Country EPA EPA 
group 
alternatives Reg group other regional 
group 
other negotiations 
LDC Burundi Agreed interim EPA in November 2007, 
negotiations for comprehensive EPA 
ongoing 
EAC EBA EAC COMESA, ECCAS COMESA-EU until 
mid 2007 
LDC Rwanda Agreed interim EPA in November 2007, 
negotiations for comprehensive EPA 
ongoing 
EAC EBA EAC COMESA COMESA-EU until 
mid 2007 
LDC Tanzania Agreed interim EPA in November 2007, 
negotiations for comprehensive EPA 
ongoing 
EAC EBA EAC SADC  
LDC Uganda Agreed interim EPA in November 2007, 
negotiations for comprehensive EPA 
ongoing 
EAC EBA EAC COMESA, IGAD? COMESA-EU until 
mid 2007 
nonLDC Kenya Agreed interim EPA in November 2007, 
negotiations for comprehensive EPA 
ongoing 
EAC GSP EAC COMESA, CEN-
SAD? 
COMESA-EU until 
mid 2007 
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Table 11. Overview of EPA negotiations status and regional groupings in SADC 
LDC 
designation 
Country EPA EPA 
group 
alternatives Regional 
group 
other regional 
group 
LDC Angola Did not agree interim EPA. Negotiations for  
comprehensive EPA ongoing 
SADC EBA SADC  
nLDC Botswana Agreed interim EPA in 2007 and signed in 2009. 
Negotiations for comprehensive EPA ongoing 
SADC GSP SADC SACU 
LDC Lesotho Agreed interim EPA in 2007 and signed in 2009. 
Negotiations for comprehensive EPA ongoing 
SADC EBA SADC SACU 
LDC Mozambique Agreed interim EPA in 2007 and signed in 2009. 
Negotiations for comprehensive EPA ongoing 
SADC EBA SADC  
nLDC Namibia Agreed interim EPA in 2007 but not yet signed. 
Negotiations for comprehensive EPA ongoing 
SADC GSP SADC SACU 
nLDC Swaziland Agreed interim EPA in 2007 and signed in 2009. 
Negotiations for comprehensive EPA ongoing 
SADC GSP SADC SACU 
nLDC South Africa Did not agree interim EPA. Negotiations for 
comprehensive EPA ongoing 
SADC GSP/TDCA 
(FTA) 
SADC SACU 
LDC DR Congo Negotiations for comprehensive EPA ongoing CEMAC EBA SADC ECCAS, 
COMESA 
LDC Madagascar Agreed interim EPA in 2007 and signed the agreement in 
2009, negotiations for comprehensive EPA ongoing 
ESA EBA COMESA SADC, IOC 
LDC Malawi Negotiations for comprehensive EPA ongoing ESA EBA COMESA SADC 
nLDC Mauritius Agreed interim EPA in 2007 and signed the agreement in 
2009, negotiations for comprehensive EPA ongoing 
ESA GSP COMESA SADC, IOC 
LDC Zambia Agreed interim EPA in November 2007. Has not yet 
signed the agreement, negotiations for comprehensive 
EPA 
ESA EBA COMESA SADC 
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nLDC Zimbabwe Agreed interim EPA in November 2007 and signed the 
agreement in August 2009, negotiations for 
comprehensive EPA ongoing 
ESA GSP COMESA SADC 
nLDC Seychelles Agreed interim EPA in November 2007 and signed the 
agreement in August 2009, negotiations for 
comprehensive EPA ongoing 
ESA GSP COMESA SADC, IOC 
LDC Tanzania Agreed interim EPA in November 2007, negotiations for 
comprehensive EPA ongoing 
EAC EBA EAC SADC 
Appendix B: Terms of Reference 
 
TERMS OF REFERENCE 
REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN AFRICA: 
PROSPECTS AND STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION 
 
1. Background 
In 2005, Denmark published its first strategy for Trade and Development, with a strong 
focus on the developmental aspects of international trade policies. This strategy clearly 
emphasised the importance of better integration in world markets for developing 
countries in order to achieve and sustain higher economic growth and poverty reduction. 
In recognition of the limited integration of developing countries in world trade and 
international economic relations, the strategy emphasised the need to provide 
developing countries with support to reduce barriers on the supply-side, as well as 
continuing to provide preferential access to developed markets in order to spur 
integration of developing countries into world markets.   
 
Denmark launched a new policy for development assistance in 2010, with a strong focus 
on Growth and Employment. With Aid for Trade (in the broad sense) at the centre of 
Danish development policy, the Danish strategy for Trade and Development was 
included in the Growth and Employment strategy.  
 
Over the past decade, new trends in the global economy have emerged and the balance 
in the world economy has shifted dramatically. Nevertheless, many developing countries 
have failed to substantially expand and diversify – even during times when the global 
economy has offered amble opportunities. Denmark works specifically on improving 
the integration of marginalised economies through its trade and development policy – 
and is working on adjusting these policies to the changing world economy.  
 
As part of this adjustment, the Task Force for Trade and Development in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (simply ‘the Task Force’ hereafter) commissioned a brief overview of 
‘Trade Policy and Low Income Countries – Emerging Issues and Unfinished Business’, 
which was completed in June 2011. On the basis of this overview, the Task Force is 
now commissioning a further study to enhance its knowledge base concerning a 
relatively new area of Danish Aid for Trade support, namely support for regional 
economic integration. The 2010 strategy for Growth and Employment includes Danish 
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support for regional economic integration in Africa. Following recommendations of the 
Danish Africa Commission, Denmark will provide support to economic integration on 
the Continent – through support to existing sub-regional economic integration 
initiatives, including notably the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern 
Africa Development Community (SADC). A programme to provide substantial Danish 
financial and technical support to the EAC to assist with full implementation of the 
EAC Customs Union Protocol (agreed in 2005) and the recent Common Market 
Protocol (2010) has just been approved.  
 
2. Objective of the Assignment 
The objective of the assignment is to enhance the knowledge of recent changes in trade 
(and investment flows, to the extent data on these are readily available) within two 
economic areas, the EAC and SADC – in order to better understand the dynamics of 
these two rapidly changing areas, the emerging patterns, and the opportunities and 
challenges of these changes.  
 
3. Outputs 
The following outputs will be provided: 
 
 A research report of approximately 40 pages, including all data and analyses 
outlined below; 
 2 policy briefs (not to exceed 4 pages each) on issues to be selected jointly by the 
research team and the Task Force. The issues will be identified amongst the 
findings of the research report. The aim of the policy briefs will be to 
communicate the findings of the research report to a wider audience; and 
 One public presentation/seminar to disseminate and discuss findings and 
recommendations of the research team (to be decided with the Task Force). 
 
 
4. Scope of Work 
The scope of work will include: 
 
a. An analysis of regional trade flows at the six-digit levels and an analysis of total 
investment flows for members of EAC and SADC based on readily available 
information. The analysis should cover the latest decade of, respectively EAC and 
SADC trade. With a view to deepen knowledge of changing trade and investment 
patterns for members of EAC and SADC, respectively, this analysis will focus on 
trends in intra-regional trade (within each of the two regional groups), in terms of 
value and main items – and on broader South-South trade, including trade with 
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emerging markets (the BRIC countries, in particular China, and other relevant 
groupings);  
 
b. A review of the status of implementation of the agreed protocols (e.g. have internal 
tariffs been removed? What are the fiscal implications for each member country? 
Have mechanisms for compensation been put in place?); 
 
c. A review of key non-tariff barriers to deeper economic integration in the EAC and 
SADC, respectively – with a focus on the most important barriers to further 
economic integration between member states of the EAC and SADC, respectively; 
 
d. A review of the opportunities and challenges of regional trade integration in the 
EAC and SADC, respectively (to the extent information is readily available) – both 
between member states and for different groups within each country (who are the 
likely winners and losers); 
 
e. A review of the opportunities and challenges to the EAC and SADC, respectively, of 
a gradual liberalisation of services, investment, and procurement – as has been 
proposed under the EU Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs);  
 
f. An assessment of whether the proposed EPAs with  the EU supports further the 
ambition for wider and deeper trade integration within the EAC and SADC, 
respectively – and the broader Free Trade Area in COMESA (the Tri-Partite); and 
 
g. Policy recommendations, based on the findings of the research team, concerning 
future Danish Aid for Trade interventions (including but not necessarily limited to 
support to regional economic integration in Africa), and future Danish trade policy 
interventions through the EU.  
 
5. Method of Work 
The basic methodology applied will be literature review of existing and readily available 
scientific and grey literatures. Scientific literature includes peer reviewed articles in 
academic journals while grey literature includes non-refereed material, such as reports of 
international organisations. No original research will be required for the completion of 
the assignment. Quantitative work will be limited to the simple compilation of readily 
available trade data necessary to address work task (a). 
 
The assignment will not involve travel. 
 
The assignment will be carried out in close consultation with the Task Force. 
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6. Research team 
The research will be undertaking in collaboration between Mr Michael Friis Jensen, who 
is an independent consultant, and the Institute of Food and Resource Economics (FØI), 
Faculty of Life Sciences, University of Copenhagen. The inputs from FØI will be 
coordinated by Associate Professor, Mr Wusheng Yu. 
 
Mr. Jensen will act as overall responsible to the Task Force and will coordinate and edit 
joint outputs 
 
7. Division of research tasks 
 
The research tasks listed under section 5 of this document will be divided between Mr 
Jensen and the FØI, as follows: 
 
Mr Jensen will be responsible for tasks b, c, and g; whereas FØI will be responsible for 
tasks a, d, e, and f.  
 
The research report will be drafted jointly by Mr Jensen and Mr Yu who will draw on 
their findings in the respective research tasks. Mr Jensen will be responsible for 
coordination and final editing. In addition, as the overall responsible person of the 
project, Mr Jensen will be responsible for drafting the introduction and conclusion of 
the research report. 
 
Mr Jensen and Mr Yu will each be responsible for one policy brief. Mr Jensen will be 
responsible for coordination and final editing. 
 
Planning and implementation of the dissemination of the project will be jointly carried 
out by Mr Jensen and Mr Yu in consultations with the Task Force. 
 
 
 
 
 
